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Abstract 
The question of the nature of knowledge-how is philosophically puzzling, because alongside 
the substantive disagreement about whether knowledge-how is a kind of propositional knowledge 
or not, there is methodological disagreement about how to answer this question. Since it would be 
undesirable for this debate to disintegrate into a methodological stand-off, in which opposing sides 
of the question could not agree on how to resolve the issue, it is important to take stock of the 
methodologies which are in play in the debate, and consider how to reconcile them. This is my 
project in this thesis. 
 To achieve this aim I will consider the use of results from linguistics to argue that 
knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that, and the use of counterexamples against the view that it 
is not. I will argue that neither source of evidence is philosophically decisive. The appeal to linguistics 
relies on various controversial philosophical theses, and ignores relevant philosophical issues. Using 
counterexamples to show that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that is problematic; firstly 
because there are several distinct positions which contend that knowledge-how is not a kind of 
knowledge-that, and secondly because counterexamples are not the final word, dialectically 
speaking, on any analysis. I will not attempt to argue that these sources of evidence are irrelevant, 
but that they are useful tools only when used alongside other considerations, especially from the 
philosophy of mind. In order to show how considerations from the philosophy of mind can be 
relevant to inquiry into the nature of knowledge-how, I will consider the connection of knowledge-
how to intentional action, and argue that this offers a picture of knowing how which can be used to 
assess accounts of knowledge how. 
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Introduction 
The recent literature on knowing how is puzzling. The central question is simple: is knowing-
how a kind of knowledge-that? It is a question about the world, and how the entities in it are 
organised: whether one species of knowledge is a sub-species of another species of knowledge. One 
might think that the obvious way of answering it is by investigating what role knowing how plays in 
the life of a minded creature. This is not the approach which the majority of participants in the 
debate have taken. Instead of investigating knowledge how itself, they discuss the syntax and 
semantics of the sentences which are used to ascribe knowing how, and consider the views of the 
folk about various cases. Since the initial question concerned what knowledge how is, not how we 
describe it, or the nature of its folk-concept, it might be unclear why these considerations are 
relevant. This puzzlement raises a deep methodological issue: if the subject matter of philosophical 
investigation is neither linguistic nor conceptual, how can we successfully address philosophical 
questions by appeal to linguistic or conceptual considerations?1  
Some philosophers have argued that linguistic and conceptual considerations are simply 
irrelevant to questions about the nature of the world. By their lights, addressing a philosophical 
question by appealing to linguistic or conceptual considerations changes the question to one about 
language or concepts.   
For example, in discussing Stanley and Williamson’s linguistic argument against the 
distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that, Alva Noë comments that: 
“It is difficult to see how the positive analysis offered by Stanley and Williamson entails the 
falsehood of Ryle’s distinction between knowledge how and knowledge that. Ryle’s 
distinction is not a thesis about the sentences used to attribute propositional and practical 
knowledge respectively. It is a thesis about the nature of practical and propositional 
knowledge.2 
Noë seems to suggest that in considering language, Stanley and Williamson miss the point. 
Similarly, Hilary Kornblith prefaces his discussion of the methodology of epistemology with a 
scathing attack on the investigation of the concept of knowledge: 
“The idea that philosophy consists in, or, at a minimum, must begin with an understanding 
and investigation of our concepts is, I believe, both natural and very attractive. It is also, I 
                                                          
1
 See (Brown 2012) for an in-depth discussion of this issue in epistemology, with some suggestions about the 
relevance of linguistic and conceptual considerations to philosophical inquiry. 
2
 (Noë 2005, pp.286-7) 
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believe, deeply mistaken. On my view, the subject matter of ethics is the right and the good, 
not our concepts of them. The subject matter of philosophy of mind is the mind itself, not 
our concept of it. And the subject matter of epistemology is knowledge itself, not our 
concept of knowledge.”3  
I agree with these methodological sceptics that we as philosophers ought to be more self-
conscious about the methods which we employ, and that this requires a better understanding of the 
relevance of linguistic and conceptual considerations to philosophical inquiry. But I disagree with 
their wholesale scepticism about the use of linguistic and conceptual considerations. Linguistic and 
conceptual considerations can be legitimate philosophical evidence, if used appropriately. 
It would be unsatisfactory if the debate about the nature of knowledge how became simply 
a methodological one, in which different kinds of evidence were found to favour different accounts. 
There ought to be a way of assessing the evidence adduced in favour of various accounts, despite its 
diverse sources. In this essay I will make a contribution to this project by considering two types of 
evidence used in the debate about knowledge-how. I will consider the use of linguistic 
considerations used by Stanley and Williamson to argue that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-
that, and the use of counterexamples against the view that knowledge-how is ability. In both cases I 
will argue that these approaches do raise relevant issues, but that they do not resolve the question 
of the nature of knowledge-how by themselves. This is not to say that they are irrelevant, but that 
they should not be the only source of evidence considered. 
Although my investigation is primarily methodological, and as such I will not try to argue for 
any particular view of knowledge how, I hope to make two substantive contributions to the debate.  
The first will be to offer a novel way of setting up the debate. Traditionally, following Ryle, 
the debate has been set up with the players being the Intellectualists, who think that knowledge-
how is a kind of knowledge-that, and the Anti-Intellectualists, who think that Intellectualism is false, 
and that knowledge how is mere ability. I think that identifying Anti-Intellectualism with an ability-
based picture of knowledge how neglects the variety of Anti-Intellectualist positions. Hence, I will 
distinguish between Praxism, which claims that knowledge-how is mere ability, and Ryleanism, 
which claims that knowledge-how is a capacity-based, non-propositional form of knowledge. 
The second contribution will be to argue that the arguments for Intellectualism are less 
plausible than has often been thought, since linguistics is not a decisive form of evidence, and the 
                                                          
3
 (Kornblith 2002, p.1) 
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counterexamples used against Anti-Intellectualism have various flaws. By implication, this means 
that Anti-Intellectualism is more defensible than has been thought. 
In the first section, I will set out a picture of what is at issue in the debate, and discuss the 
different positions which one might hold about the nature of knowledge how, distinguishing 
Intellectualism, Ryleanism and Praxism, relating them back to Ryle’s discussion, and the question of 
whether knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. In the second section I will consider Stanley 
and Williamson’s linguistic argument for Intellectualism. Following this in the third section, I will 
begin my methodological considerations proper by considering Stanley and Williamson’s use of 
syntactic and semantic theory. I will argue that although considerations from linguistics do raise 
important issues, treating linguistics as the sole and decisive form of evidence misses out extremely 
pertinent evidence against Intellectualism, and ignores the assumptions which must be made in 
interpreting semantic claims into a metaphysical picture. In the fourth section, I will turn to the use 
of counterexamples against Anti-Intellectualism, and consider what these cases, and our intuitive 
judgments about them, can show us. Again, my conclusion will be negative: although 
counterexamples play an important dialectical role in the debate they cannot by themselves decide 
what account is to be preferred. In particular, the counterexamples presented in the literature do 
not demonstrate the falsity of Anti-Intellectualism. In the final section, I offer something of a positive 
methodological contribution by considering how the role which knowledge how plays in intentional 
action might help us to shed some light on different accounts. 
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1. Preliminaries 
Before plunging into methodological issues, it is worth considering the logical space in which 
the debate about knowledge how takes place. In this section, I will consider why we might be 
philosophically interested with knowledge how, sketch out the logical space and try to clear up some 
confusions about the possible positions which one might take.  
In the first section I will consider an intuitive problem about knowledge how. In the standard 
case, when someone knows, they know something, which they can typically express in a full 
grammatical sentence, but in many cases of knowing how, the agent cannot adequately express 
their knowledge, or even offer a gloss on what it is that they know. I will use this puzzle to set out 
three positions on the nature of knowledge how: that it is a species of knowledge which takes a non-
propositional object (Ryleanism), that it is mere ability (Praxism), and that it is a species of 
knowledge which takes a propositional object (Intellectualism). Ryleanism and Praxism have often 
been conflated under the Anti-Intellectualist head, in large part due to mis-readings of Ryle’s 
discussion of knowledge how. In the second section, I will try to clear up these confusions by 
considering Ryle’s contribution to the debate, and arguing that he is not a Praxist. In the third 
section I will offer a more formal characterisation of these three positions, and connect them to the 
question of whether knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that. In the fourth section, I will 
consider some possible confusions about the species-genus conception of the debate. 
1.1. A Problem about Knowing How 
 We have a fairly good grasp of the kind of knowledge which we ascribe in sentences of the 
form ‘A knows that F’. This should hardly be a surprise – knowledge permeates many of our 
everyday practices, and in understanding these practices we must surely make use of the concept of 
knowledge. We could hardly make sense of practical reasoning, testimony or the quotidian search 
for truth without it. There are a number of well-established generalisations within this folk 
conception of knowledge. When you know, you know a fact,4 which you can assert in a full 
grammatical sentence. In the standard case you will also believe that fact to be true with some kind 
of reason or justification, meaning that when you tell someone else what you know, they will know it 
too (if they believe you).5 I will call the picture of knowledge as possessing these properties the 
Traditional Conception of knowledge. 
                                                          
4
 I will use ‘fact’ and ‘true proposition’ interchangeably. 
5
 These conditions are deliberately vague – my goal is to elucidate a conception of knowledge, not to give 
necessary and sufficient conditions. 
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 Of course, epistemology has other interests besides knowing facts. We might be 
philosophically interested in other species of knowledge, such as that which is ascribed in the direct 
object construction: as in ‘Ruth knows Spanish’, or ‘Amy knows Florence’. We might also be 
interested in other intellectual concepts such as understanding, testimony and intellectual virtue.6 
Broadening epistemology is certainly one reason to be concerned with knowledge how: as Katherine 
Hawley points out: “knowledge-how is interesting qua species of knowledge.” 7 However, there is 
also a philosophical puzzle which ought to motivate a special concern about the nature of knowledge 
how.  
 The phenomenon which I think puzzles philosophers is that it is not clear what we know 
when we know how to do something.8 In the cases of knowledge which are traditionally considered 
in epistemology it is easy to say what is known. If you know that David Cameron is the Prime 
minister, what you know is the fact that David Cameron is the Prime Minister. It is true that it is 
possible to locate a known fact in some cases of knowing how: when you know how to turn on the 
lights, you know that you can do it by flicking the switch, when you know how to annoy someone, 
you know that doing certain things gets on their nerves.  
In other cases, this model seems not to apply: consider knowing how to ride a bicycle. It is 
tempting to deal with this case in the same way as the examples above by finding some facts which 
knowing how to ride a bicycle relates one to. We could probably come up with some facts about 
riding bicycles which we know because we know how to ride bicycles - that you need to keep your 
balance and move your legs to turn the pedals – but these are likely to be unsatisfying as an account 
of knowing how to ride a bicycle. Knowledge how to ride a bicycle is exercised in skilfully riding a 
bicycle and explains success in bicycle-riding, but this piecemeal knowledge of facts seems to do 
neither. This raises the question: how is it that we can know how to do things like ride bicycles given 
that we cannot locate facts which adequately circumscribe this knowledge? 
It is important to notice that this problem does not arise for all knowledge ascribed with the 
word ‘how’. Knowing how to turn on the lights and how to annoy someone are examples of know-
how which relate knowers to facts, which they can express in language. The difficult cases of 
knowledge how are those which relate to basic action (walking, swimming, cycling) or skilled actions 
(playing sports, diagnosing illness, painting). This is a point to which we shall frequently return, but it 
is important to bear in mind. 
                                                          
6
 For example, see (Kvanvig 2003), (Lackey 2008), (Zagzebski 1996) 
7
 (Hawley 2003 p.19), see also (Hawley 2010, 2011) for discussion relating to knowledge how in relation to 
testimony and epistemic injustice. 
8
 Adrian Moore calls this idea the independence claim (Moore 1997, C8) 
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We can formulate the problem about the difficult class of knowledge how as a triad of 
individually plausible but mutually incompatible claims. We want to say: (1) that knowing is a 
relation to a fact, which is apt to be expressed by the agent in a full grammatical sentence, because 
of our commitment to the traditional conception of knowledge. We also want to say (2) that some of 
us know how to ride bicycles (among other things), and that this is a kind of knowledge. But then we 
have a problem, insofar as it is true that (3) we cannot find anything satisfying which we can identify 
as the fact which we know in cases like knowing how to ride a bicycle.  
There are three moves which we could make to resolve this puzzle: 
- Deny (1) If we deny (1) then we claim that facts are not the only things which we are related 
to by knowledge. We might follow Ryle in calling the knowledge which does not relate us to 
propositions knowledge-how, and claim that the object of knowledge-how is activities rather 
than facts. I will call this position Ryleanism. 
- Deny (2) Alternatively, we might say that since we cannot offer an account of what we know 
in cases like knowing how to ride a bicycle, we should deny that these cases are ones of 
knowledge. This seems like a fairly sceptical conclusion, but it could be made a little more 
palatable if we argue that know-how talk can be paraphrased as ability talk. I will call this 
position Praxism.9 
-  Deny (3) Finally, we might defend the traditional conception of knowledge by arguing that 
knowledge how is really a disguised species of knowledge of facts. We might claim it is 
propositional knowledge of rules or procedures for engaging in some activity. In deference 
to Ryle, I will call this position Intellectualism.10 
We might think that at this point the question is just to refine Intellectualism. Since we have 
a clear conception of knowledge such that it relates us to facts which we can assert, and think that 
knowing how to ride a bicycle is a kind of knowledge, we just need to find a way of applying the 
propositional framework to the difficult cases. I think that this attitude is mistaken, because in 
addition to the lack of a clear propositional object, knowledge how does not possess the other 
features of the traditional conception of knowledge 
                                                          
9
 It might be the case that no one is a Praxist in the sense of being committed to the claim that knowledge how 
is not a kind of knowledge, but since the ability to do things is not a species of knowledge, it is difficult to see 
how a Praxist might avoid this implication.  
10
 A related version of this move would be to understand knowledge how in terms of some other well-
understood epistemic state, such as knowledge of objects, or understanding. Unfortunately, I do not have 
space to discuss this option here. See (Bengson and Moffett 2007, 2011b).  
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I have claimed that knowledge that something is the case is normally expressible in 
language, associated with a belief, is justified, and is in the game of testimony and telling. It is fairly 
difficult to see how the problematic kind of knowledge how could play any of these roles. Since we 
don’t have a proposal about what it is that we know when we know-how, it is difficult to see just 
what it would be to express one’s knowledge how to ride a bicycle in language, or what the 
associated belief(s) might be. We cannot say just that I believe how, since this is ungrammatical.11 
The association of know-how with beliefs is further weakened when we observe that we quite often 
have false beliefs about how to do things, without this undermining our knowing how to do them.12  
Knowledge how does not seem apt for justification or reasoning either. It simply does not 
make sense to ask someone for the grounds of knowing how to do something.13 And, unlike 
knowledge of facts, the content of the knowledge does not provide evidence from which to infer 
facts. If I really know that I have hands, then I know that I am not a Brain in a vat, whereas it does 
not seem true that if I really know how to swim, then I know that I am not a Brain in a vat.14 Finally, 
knowledge-how seems to be associated with a different kind of learning to knowledge-that.15 This 
can be illustrated by the intuitive point that you need to learn more than facts in order to know how 
to ride a bicycle.16   
If a type of knowledge failed to fulfil one or two of these conditions, we might be able to 
assimilate it into the traditional conception. That the difficult kind of knowledge how fails all of these 
conditions should raise concerns about the plausibility of the traditional conception of knowledge, 
and motivate us to consider Praxism and Ryleanism as live alternatives to Intellectualism.  
1.2. Ryle and the Philosophical Theory of Intelligence 
Ryle is generally taken to have key role in the debate about the nature of knowledge how, 
both in broaching the issue of the nature of knowledge how and in setting out the possible positions 
which one might hold. However, his position is frequently misunderstood in a way that distorts the 
                                                          
11
 (Ryle 2009 p.17) (page references throughout are to the 2009 edition) 
12
 (Glick 2009 p.73), (Wallis, 2008 pp.130-37)  A nice example is knowing how to catch (Devitt 2011a p.216). 
Most people believe that the way to catch is to calculate the trajectory of the ball and then move 
appropriately, whereas it seems that the actual method employed relies solely on changes in the angle of gaze. 
(Reed, McLeod, and Dienes 2010) 
13
 (Ryle 2009 p.17) 
14
 (Sgaravatti and Zardini 2008, p244-52) see also (Glick 2009 p.72) 
15
 (Ryle 1945 pp.14-15;  2009, pp. 28-30, 37) (Hawley 2010) 
16
 Another feature of knowledge-that which has received a great deal of attention is Gettierisability (Stanley 
and Williamson 2001) (Poston 2009), (Stanley 2011a, 2011b), (Cath,2011).  I am unsure how to frame the 
question of the Gettierisability of knowledge how, since the difficult kind of know how is not obviously 
associated with a justified belief. Another important question which I lack the space to explore here is whether 
the value of knowledge how has a distinctive kind of epistemic value. 
14 
 
debate. According to a commonly held view, he proposes a ‘fundamental’ distinction between 
knowing how and knowing that according to which knowing that is a behaviourally-inert relation to a 
proposition, which must be considered to be put into action, whereas knowing how to do something 
is just the ability to do it.17 In reality, Ryle does not have any very definitive views about knowledge 
how, other than that it cannot be reduced to knowledge of facts, and he certainly does not endorse 
a fundamental distinction between knowledge-how or knowledge-that, or equate knowing how with 
ability. 
Ryle’s discussion of knowing how and knowing that is found in his 1945 address to the 
Aristotelian Society, and in chapter 2 of The Concept of Mind. Although there is a deal of overlap in 
these papers, they have different aims. In the Address, Ryle’s interest lies in intelligent practice both 
practical and theoretical, and his goal is to demonstrate that we exercise intelligence directly in 
practice, rather than only as a by-product of the propositions which we know. In the chapter, Ryle 
argues against an aspect of the Cartesian myth which assimilates intelligence concepts to internal 
operations, and he uses more examples of practical competences to make his point that we need an 
idea of intelligence exercised in action. However, in both pieces his opponent is the same. He aims to 
undermine the Intellectualist picture of the mind, according to which intelligence lies solely in the 
capacity to theorise and generate propositional knowledge.18  
His overarching aim is to reorient our understanding of intelligence away from the Cartesian 
model. In the chapter, he claims that his goal is: 
“To show that when we describe people as exercising qualities of mind, we are not referring 
to occult episodes of which their overt acts and utterances are effects; we are referring to 
those overt acts and utterances themselves.”19  
This might seem a little out of place in Ryle’s hatchet job on Cartesian thinking, but in an 
important way the critique of the Intellectualist picture of intelligence is a microcosm of his anti-
Cartesian project to replace the tendency to think of the mental as inner with a picture of the 
explanatory role of mental language in human life.20  
Ryle claims that the Intellectualist’s attempt to account for intelligence falls into a regress.21 
The basic contention is that the Intellectualist’s only account of how knowledge can motivate 
                                                          
17
 See (Stanley and Williamson 2001), (Snowdon 2004) 
18
 (Ryle 1945, p.5, 2009 p.26) 
19
 (Ryle, 2009, p.14)  
20
 (Ryle, 2009, p.32) 
21
 (Ryle 1945 pp.2-3; 2009, pp.19-20)  
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intelligent action is via the consideration of propositions. However, once the Intellectualist admits 
this, she has a serious problem. The mere consideration of propositions does not guarantee 
intelligent action, because one could consider the wrong proposition, at the wrong time, in the 
wrong way. So the Intellectualist needs an account of the intelligent consideration of propositions. 
However, because she explains intelligence by appealing to propositional knowledge, she can only 
offer such an account by positing more propositional knowledge, about which the same concern 
about application will clearly emerge, leading to a regress. Ryle’s lesson from this regress is that 
intelligence cannot be purely explained by or reduced to knowledge of propositions, since explaining 
intelligence by appeal to the exercise of propositional knowledge assumes the very faculty of 
intelligence which it sets out to explain.  
His treatment for the Intellectualist confusion is not to propose a theory of knowledge how. 
Ryle’s overall project is not conceptual analysis, but what he calls Logical Geography: the project of 
giving a map to allow us to navigate the concepts which we already possess.22 The goal of this 
project is not truth, but knowing our way about better. In pursuit of this goal he offers us not a 
theory of knowing how, but a discussion of practical intelligence which offers us a better 
understanding of the nature of intelligence, and its relation to knowing how. Ryle’s lesson is that we 
must understand intelligence in relation to what people do, rather than in relation to the mental 
operations from which their action flows and that in order to do so, we must recognise a notion of 
non-propositional knowledge. 
1.3. The Standard Reading of Ryle 
The picture of Ryle as trying to offer us a picture of practical intelligence grounded in a non-
propositional notion of knowledge how has been obscured by a widely held but mistaken view of his 
discussion. According to this view, Ryle’s discussion of knowledge how aims to defend two theses: 
that know-how and know-that are distinct explanatory notions, and that knowing how to do 
something is just the ability to do it.23 This reading is most clearly identified by Snowdon, but is at 
work elsewhere. For example, the idea of the fundamental distinction between knowledge-how and 
knowledge-that is often central in stating the ‘ability’ response to Frank Jackson’s ‘Mary’ argument.24 
                                                          
22
 See the introduction to The Concept of Mind (Ryle 2009 pp.lix-lxi ) and his essay Abstractions (Ryle 1962), 
see also (Tanney 2009a, 2009b) 
23
 Key proponents of this reading are (Stanley and Williamson 2001), and (Snowdon 2004). (Stanley 2011b C1) 
steers away from attributing the ability thesis, but continues to attribute the distinctness thesis to Ryle.  
24
 The ability response is often paraphrased by saying that knowing what it’s like is knowing how, not knowing 
that. It might be the case that Nemirow equates knowledge how with mere ability (Nemirow 1990), but Lewis 
is clear that propositional knowledge is involved in ability. For example: “aspects of ability are purely and 
16 
 
I will briefly discuss each of these theses, to try to show that Ryle does not subscribe to 
either. 
1.3.1. Distinctness? 
It is tempting to think that Ryle’s argument for the existence of a non-propositional species 
of knowledge how should lead us to recognise two species of knowledge which play entirely 
different roles. His way of speaking about knowledge how can give the impression of a deep 
distinction,25 but this picture of his discussion is out of line with his wider project.  
Seeing Ryle as endorsing a fundamental distinction importantly misconceives both Ryle’s 
purpose in discussing knowledge how, and the point of the regress argument. His aim is not to make 
sharp distinctions between different species of knowledge, but to reorient our thinking about 
knowledge by giving us a map to think about practical intelligence. The regress argument commits 
Ryle to thinking that intelligence is not simply knowledge of propositions, but this does not mean 
that he thinks that propositional knowledge has no role to play in understanding intelligence. It is 
quite compatible with the regress argument that we sometimes do consider propositions before 
acting intelligently; Ryle’s point is that we must do so intelligently, and that this is not merely a 
matter of having more propositional knowledge.26  
When we look at Ryle’s wider epistemological picture, there are clear conceptual 
connections between knowledge-how and knowledge-that. Ryle thinks that know-how is important 
for understanding theoretical reasoning,27 thinks that know-how can be formulated into 
propositional rules of thumb,28 and claims that knowledge-that is dependent on knowledge-how. 29 
Furthermore, Ryle thinks that ‘knowledge’ is a generic dispositional term, meaning that he cannot 
endorse a distinction between a behaviourally inert conception of knowledge-that and a 
behaviourally active conception of knowledge-how: for him knowledge that is just as much of a 
dispositional concept as knowledge how.30 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
simply, a matter of information. If you want to know how to open the combination lock on the bank vault, 
information is all you need.” (Lewis 2004 p.100).  
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1.3.2. Is Knowledge how Ability? 
Ryle does make claims which could be read as offering an equation of knowledge how with 
ability. For example at the beginning of the section on knowing how and knowing that he says: 
“When a person is described by one or other of the intelligence-epithets such as ‘shrewd’ or 
‘silly’, ‘prudent’ or ‘imprudent’, the description imputes to him not the knowledge, or 
ignorance, of this or that truth, but the ability, or inability, to do certain sorts of things.”31 
If one reads Ryle as a behaviourist, then it is tempting to read this quote as endorsing the 
equation of know-how with ability. However, as we have seen, Ryle is not interested in constructing 
theories, so he cannot be committed to anything like analytical behaviourism. 32 Although in a 
passage like this Ryle situates intelligence within the range of ability concepts, he makes no 
analytical claim about the kind of disposition which is in play or what its exercises are. His claim is 
that knowledge how is in the same conceptual space as ability, not that knowledge how is ability.33 
He in fact warns against identifying knowing how with a uniform disposition to act, claiming that its 
exercises are ‘indefinitely heterogeneous’.34  
Once we focus in on Ryle’s positive claims about practical intelligence, it should be clear that 
he actively distinguishes knowledge how from ability. His distinction between intelligent capacities 
and habits makes this particularly clear, since it shows that he thinks that not all abilities count as 
knowledge-how. Whereas Ryle takes habits to be single track dispositions, learnt by drill, and 
insensitive to the particular situation, pieces of know-how are intelligent multi-track dispositions, 
learnt by practice, and sensitive to the particular situation.35 Unlike habit, Ryle thinks that the 
capacity associated with knowing how to do something is rational and normative, consisting of the 
capacity to apply criteria to action.36 This action need be one’s own: Ryle thinks that we exercise our 
know-how both in criticising, and in observing the performances of others.37 For Ryle, knowledge-
how is not just exercised in φ-ing narrowly construed, but in a range of activities relating to φ-ing.  
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 On the behaviourist reading of Ryle see (Tanney 2009a, 2009b) 
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 “Knowing how, then, is a disposition, […] Its exercises are observances of rules or canons or the applications 
of criteria,” (Ryle 2009, p.34 see also pp.17-18, 28) 
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It is certainly true that many philosophers have made the equation of knowledge how with 
ability, some of them claiming support from Ryle.38 We ought to take this position seriously, but 
seeing it as the only alternative to Intellectualism obscures Ryle’s contribution to the debate. 
1.4.  ‘Knowledge-how is a Species of Knowledge-that’ 
Having distinguished three possible positions about the nature of knowledge-how, I will now 
turn to the bare bones of the Intellectualist and Anti-Intellectualist positions to make the logical 
space clear. I will do this by taking a slightly different tack, and asking how these three positions 
approach the question of whether knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that. 
One way of stating the issue about the nature of knowledge-how is to ask whether 
knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that. The Intellectualist claims that it is, whereas the 
Praxist and Rylean disagree, although for different reasons. The Praxist thinks that knowledge-how is 
mere ability, whereas the Rylean thinks that knowledge-how is a sui generis species of knowledge 
which relates agents to activities. 
A species-genus claim makes a necessity claim of the form: 
1) ∀(x) (Fx  Gx) 
If we plug the claim ‘knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that’ into this formula, then 
we get the following: 
2) ∀(x) (If x is knowledge-how, then x is knowledge-that) 
Although there is something right about this claim, it sounds odd, because knowledge is a 
mass noun, which means that what it refers to can be measured, but not counted. We can ask how 
much knowledge someone has, but not how many knowledges they have.39 This makes it odd to 
quantify over knowledge as if the term referred to particulars. The issue of how to understand mass 
nouns is a rather difficult one, so the temptation is be to avoid it entirely by quantifying over states 
of knowledge as if they were particulars, or over particular agents’ knowledge. For example: 
3) ∀(x) (If x is a state of knowing how to φ, then x is a state of knowing that p)  
4) ∀(S) (If S knows how to φ then S knows that p)40 
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 For example, (Bechtel and Abrahamson 1991), (Rosefeldt 2004), (Noë 2005)  
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 If we succeed in making sense of this question ‘how many?’ in relation to a mass noun, then it will refer to 
types rather than instances. Consider the question “how many metals do you have in stock?” 
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 Where φ is a variable standing for activity-types, p is a variable standing for propositions, and S is a variable 
standing for agents. 
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However, neither of these claims is any better at capturing the Intellectualist claim. The 
problem about quantifying over states of knowledge is that it requires a prior account of which 
metaphysical category knowledge-how and knowledge-that fall into. Ryle will presumably simply 
deny that knowledge can be split into states, opting for a dispositional understanding of 
knowledge.41 The problem about quantifying over agents’ knowledge is that it ignores the fact that 
knowledge-how and knowledge-that may well co-occur without being identical. Presumably 
everyone who knows how to ride a bicycle knows that bicycles have wheels, but this knowledge is 
not identical with their knowing how to ride a bicycle. 
I think that we can capture the species-genus claim by introducing an identity claim into 
species-genus claim: 
5) ∀(x) (Fx  Ǝ(y) (Gy & (x=y))). 
If we understand the Intellectualist’s identity claim in category-neutral terms as ‘are the 
same piece of knowledge’, we get the following characterisation of Intellectualism: 
6) ∀(S) (If S knows how to φ then (S knows that p, and S’s knowing how to φ and S’s 
knowing that p are the same piece of knowledge)).42 
This is a general version of Intellectualism, which any particular Intellectualist account will 
entail. In order to provide an analysis of knowledge how, an Intellectualist will have to identify a set 
of necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. Since not every known proposition suffices for 
know-how, they will need to find some way of restricting to a relevant kind of proposition.43  
7) S knows how to φ, if and only if S knows that p and R(p)  
Where R is a property which restricts to the relevant kind of proposition, in accordance with 
the analysis in question. 
Ryleanism and Praxism agree on the falsehood of (6), and hence of all versions of the 
Intellectualist analysis along the lines of (7). Since both positions situate knowledge how in the 
family of capacity-concepts, they can also agree on a counter-claim to (6) about what category 
knowing how falls into. 
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 This will need to be slightly adjusted to allow for one-many identity claims between knowledge-how and 
knowledge-that, see §5.2 below. 
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8) ∀(S) (If S knows how to φ then ( S has the capacity to ψ, and S’s knowing how to φ is 
nothing over and above S’s capacity to ψ)) 
I will call any view which asserts this claim Anti-Intellectualist. Within the Anti-Intellectualist 
species-genus claim, we have an alternate conceptual space within which to give an analysis of 
knowledge how in terms of capacity.44  
It is at this point at which we see the difference between Praxism and Ryleanism. The Praxist 
claims that: 
9)   S knows how to φ if and only if S possesses the ability to φ 
The alternative to Praxism is to identify knowledge how with a capacity which counts as a 
type of knowledge. In order to offer such an account, the Rylean gives an account of what kind of 
capacity knowing how is, and what its exercise is. We might offer the following as a general gloss on 
Ryleanism (bearing in mind that Ryle himself offers no substantive account of knowledge how): 
10) S knows how to φ, if and only if S possesses the capacity to ψ and R(ψ)  
Where paralleling the Intellectualist claim, R is a property which restricts to the relevant 
type of activity. This analysis is distinct from that offered by the Praxist, because it can endorse the 
claim that knowing how is exercised in activities other than φ-ing, and can give a richer account of 
the kind of capacity in question than the Praxist’s mere ability picture.  
1.5. Loose Ends in the Species-Genera claim  
The formulation offered in the previous section helps us to get clear on the three-position 
framework on the nature of knowledge how, but it leaves a couple of loose ends which might trip us 
up later on, which I will now consider. 
i) What about knowledge-that? Isn’t this whole debate empty without an account of the 
nature of knowledge-that, so that we can assess whether or not knowledge-how is a species 
of it? 
That the picture of the species-genus claim which I offer above is not committed to any 
account of propositional knowledge is a virtue, since the puzzle which I set out above is motivated by 
the idea that when you know, you know something, which is general to all accounts of propositional 
knowledge. However, it is worth pointing out that we can understand ‘knowledge-that’ in two ways: 
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as the kind of knowledge which is a relationship to a proposition, or as a thicker relationship, having 
more of the properties in the traditional conception of knowledge.45 Whereas the reduction of 
knowledge how to the thin conception of knowledge-that is plausible, the reduction to the thick 
conception is not. Knowledge-how does not look very much like what we might call ‘ordinary’ 
knowledge-that.46  
ii) What kind of species-genus relationship is in play? If we think with Ryle that knowledge how 
disposes its possessors to intelligent action, but that ordinary knowledge-that does not, how 
could it be that knowledge how is a kind of knowledge-that? 
It is true that it is difficult to see how knowledge how could possibly be ordinary knowledge 
of propositions plus some extra factor, but this does not mean that Intellectualism is obviously false. 
Some species can be reductively analysed in terms of the genus together with some other 
independently understood properties; others cannot. Snub noses are a species of nose, which also 
possess the property of being concave. Red is a kind of colour, but there is no reductive definition of 
red in terms of being coloured, together with some other property.47  A reductive Intellectualist 
might claim that knowing how consists of ordinary knowledge-that with some independently 
understood property, but a non-reductive Intellectualist can claim that knowing how is propositional 
knowledge, together with other properties unique to knowing how, which explain the connection to 
intelligent action.48 This is the kind of position which we ought to consider when we assess 
Intellectualism. 
iii) Isn’t Anti-Intellectualism obviously false? There are many examples of knowledge how which 
intuitively seems propositional, for example knowing how Trotsky died, or how to annoy 
someone. 49 
This question raises the difficult issue of how we are to pick out the interesting class of 
knowledge how. It is tempting is to identify it by considering just the knowledge ascribed with the 
words ‘know’ and ‘how’. This clearly won’t do because of examples of propositional knowledge 
ascribed with the word ‘how’. Although this issue is more pressing for the Anti-Intellectualist, to 
avoid obvious counterexamples to her position, the problem also arises for the non-reductive 
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Intellectualist, as she will need to say which class of knowledge-that is of the special, ‘knowing-how’ 
kind.  
In order to pick out the relevant class of knowledge, we might first consider what work the 
word ‘how’ is doing here. ‘How’ can refer to a range of categories which we are not concerned with 
here - events, objects, people, measurements, sensory appearances and so on. We might say that 
we are interested in ‘how?’ as it relates to acting, and restrict our attention to ‘knowing how to’, 
followed by a verb.50  
This is not quite restrictive enough, however, as there are cases of knowing how to φ which 
are also propositional. Knowing how to do something can come to simply knowing what one ought 
to do, as when we say a child knows how to behave at a funeral. Knowing how can also be just 
knowing how something is done, as when we say that someone knows how to rob a bank because 
he has seen it happen on the television. Knowing how can also be propositional knowledge of a way 
of doing something, as with the examples of switching on the light and annoying someone. We can 
set these examples to one side, as not immediately relevant to the issue at hand. Perhaps the best 
that we can do is to pick out the class of knowledge negatively by saying that we are interested in 
the kind of knowledge how for which it is not clear what the object of knowledge is, excluding the 
three kinds of obviously propositional knowledge discussed above. 
There are several positive ways of picking out the relevant type of knowledge, but I think 
that they are not entirely convincing. Devitt suggests that the psychological category of procedural 
knowledge maps onto the folk category of knowledge how, whereas Glick and Fantl suggest using 
examples of knowledge how to get a grip on the relevant phenomenon.51 I am not convinced by 
either approach. It is unclear that everything that fits into the category of procedural knowledge is of 
the same kind, as the distinction between procedural and declarative knowledge is at bottom a 
formal distinction about how information is represented, and not an epistemological distinction.52 It 
may well be that some central cases of procedural knowledge are knowledge-how of the sort which 
we are interested in, but making this judgement requires a prior notion of what knowledge how is. 
Using examples to pick out the kind of knowledge which we are interested in might be useful, but 
only if we have a neutral way of picking out relevant examples. The distinction between knowledge-
how and knowledge-that has a deep cultural history tied to notions of class, race and gender, and it 
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would be extremely undesirable to import these prejudices into our account of knowledge how by 
picking out biased examples.53  
1.6. Conclusion 
In this section, I have set out a number of preliminary issues, in order to prepare the ground 
for my discussion to come. I have set out a puzzle which motivates the key positions about the 
nature of knowledge how, and argued that we should set out a three-position debate rather than a 
two-position debate, distinguishing Intellectualism from Praxist and Rylean versions of Anti-
Intellectualism. I then moved on to discuss Ryle’s role in the debate, and distinguished his position 
from that of the Praxist, before considering how the three positions approach the question of 
whether knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that.  
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2. Stanley and Williamson’s Intellectualism 
In their 2001 article, Stanley and Williamson offer what they take to be a knock-down 
argument for Intellectualism.54 Taking inspiration from D.G Brown and Jaakko Hintikka, they offer an 
analogy between knowledge how and other kinds of knowledge ascribed with an interrogative such 
as knowing where and when,55 arguing that consideration of the semantic and syntactic claims which 
are at issue in the debate overwhelming favour the Intellectualist. They give two arguments for 
favouring their picture, which appeal to the syntax and semantics of the relevant class of ascriptions. 
The syntactic argument points out that the similarities in the structure of the sentences used to 
ascribe knowledge-how and knowledge-wh, together with the propositional character of knowledge-
wh, would lead one to think knowledge-how ascriptions are ascriptions of propositional knowledge. 
Because of the appeal to linguistic similarity, I will call this the Uniformity Argument. Their appeal to 
semantics consists in an analysis of the semantics of the embedded question in the typical know-
how ascription which they use to offer an account of knowledge how. I will call this the 
Compositional Argument. It is worth spending some time discussing these arguments separately and 
in some detail, as they appeal to different kinds of linguistic evidence, and have importantly 
different conclusions. 
In the first section, I will offer a sketch of Stanley and Williamson’s approach, and discuss 
knowledge of answers. In the second and third sections, I will set out the Uniformity and 
Compositional arguments. In the final section I will discuss three extensions which they propose to 
make their view defensible: an account of the expression of knowledge how, an account of what is 
distinctive about the interesting kind of knowledge ascribed with the word ‘how’, and an account of 
how knowledge how is exercised in action. 
2.1. Knowing the Answer 
We should start by briefly considering knowledge which is ascribed with an interrogative 
clause. Sometimes, we do not ourselves know something, but we have good evidence that someone 
else does. I might not know the name of the fungus growing on your roses, but my horticulturalist 
friend Jake will. In such cases, it would be helpful to have a tool for recommending good informants 
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to others without knowing what the informants know oneself.56 We can do this by inserting an 
interrogative into a knowledge ascription instead of a that-clause, for example by saying that Jake 
will know what the fungus is.  
Since the answers to questions are facts, when we ascribe knowledge-wh, we typically 
ascribe propositional knowledge. Consider the following examples: 
1) Ruth knows when Charles the First was executed 
2) Anna knows why heart attacks happen 
3) Bernard knows who got married in Chichester this year. 
4) Jake knows when to plant Strawberries 
The simple cases like (1) admit of easy propositional substitutions: if (1) is true, then Ruth 
knows that Charles the First was executed on the 30th January 1649. In other cases, the content of 
the embedded question is dependent on the context. For example, how detailed an answer Anna 
must know for (2) to be true depends on whether she is a child or a medical student. An ascription of 
knowledge-wh may also require knowledge of a set of propositions. For (3) to be true Bernard needs 
to know of all of the people who got married in Chichester this year that they did so. We can also 
use knowledge-wh mark knowledge of questions about what to do.57 If (4) is true, then Jake knows 
that you ought to plant Strawberries between such-and-such dates. In general, it seems plausible 
that knowledge-wh is knowledge of the answer(s) to the contextually determined question, which 
comes out as knowledge of facts.58  
A basic point is that we might think that reflecting on knowledge-wh will help us shed light 
on knowledge how, since they are both species of knowledge ascribed using interrogatives.59 Stanley 
and Williamson were by no means the first to make this point. Hintikka and Brown consider the 
relevance of knowledge-wh to knowledge-how, and argue that some knowledge-how is knowing the 
answer. However, both stop short of claiming that this analogy offers evidence against the 
distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that. Hintikka thinks that the ‘skill’ sense of ‘S 
knows how to φ’ is non-reducible because it implies that S has the skills and capacities required to 
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φ.60 Brown thinks that the distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how comes down to 
a distinction between knowledge about what is the case, and knowledge about what to do.61 
It is important to point out that the Anti-Intellectualist can also accept this analogy, because 
some knowledge how is obviously propositional. The dispute concerns only a sub-set of knowledge 
ascribed with ‘know’ + ‘how’, for which the puzzle about what is known arises. However it is true 
that the analogy suggests a way for the Intellectualist to offer an account of what you know when 
you know how. If we take the analogy with knowledge-wh seriously, then we might think knowing 
how is knowing the answer to the question “How to φ?” just as knowing why to φ is knowing the 
answer to the question “Why to φ?” This Intellectualist account is importantly different from Ryle’s 
target, which seems to have been an Intellectualist who thought that knowing how was knowing 
what he calls ‘regulative propositions’. 
One further reason why we might be concerned with the linguistics of the sentences used to 
ascribe knowledge how is that Intellectualism and Anti-Intellectualism are committed to a semantic 
account of these sentences on the basis of their metaphysical pictures. Intellectualism claims that 
knowledge how relates agents to propositions, which on this line will be the answer(s) to the 
embedded question. By contrast, the Anti-Intellectualist treats knowing how as a special kind of 
knowledge which relates agents to activities. On her account, ‘how’ does not function as a question 
word, and is instead part of the constituent phrase, ‘knows-how’. 62 Considering just their views of 
the structure of ascriptions of knowledge-how, Intellectualism and Anti-Intellectualism endorse the 
following claims: 
Intellectualism: S knows how to φ = S knows (‘how to φ?’) 
Anti-Intellectualism: S knows how to φ = S knows-how (to φ) 
Stanley and Williamson’s basic point is that accepted results in linguistics suggest that 
Intellectualism is true because best theories of the syntax and semantics treat knowledge-how as 
knowledge of the answer to an embedded question. I will now turn to the arguments which they 
offer for favouring their linguistic analysis of knowledge how ascriptions. 
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2.2. The Uniformity Argument 
To turn the analogy of knowledge-how with knowledge-wh into an argument for 
Intellectualism, there must be a reason for favouring a uniform treatment of the knowledge 
underlying all embedded question ascriptions. Jason Stanley seems to think that there is an obvious 
reason to do so: 
“It is a common assumption between the Rylean and the Intellectualist that sentences 
involving constructions like “know where + infinitive”, “know when + infinitive”, “know why 
+ infinitive”, etc. all can be defined in terms of propositional knowledge. But given that 
ascriptions of knowing-how in English look so similar to such ascriptions, it is hard to see 
how they could ascribe a different kind of mental state. This provides a powerful argument 
in favor of the conclusion that our ordinary folk notion of knowing-how is a species of 
propositional knowledge.”63  
The basic thought seems to be that since there are no relevant differences between 
ascriptions of knowledge using the word ‘how’ and other question-words, and all knowledge-wh is 
propositional, it would be strange if the knowledge ascribed with the word ‘how’ was not 
propositional. 64 
Stanley and Williamson point out that although some Anti-Intellectualists have appealed to 
the presence of the question ‘how?’ and the infinitival phrase in knowledge how ascriptions, neither 
of these features is sufficient evidence that the knowledge ascribed is non-propositional, given that 
each occurs in propositional knowledge ascriptions. 65 Consider the following examples: 
5) Hannah knows whom Bill called for help yesterday (embedded question). 
6) Hannah knows why to vote for Gore (embedded question + infinitive). 
7) Hannah knows how Trotsky died (embedded how-question). 
The presence of the embedded question does not indicate the presence of a kind of non-
propositional knowledge, as we have seen that knowledge-wh ascribes propositional knowledge. (5) 
just means that Hannah knows that Bill called so-and-so for help yesterday. The presence of the 
infinitive is not decisive either: (6) says that Hannah knows that such-and-such are reasons why one 
ought to vote for Gore. There is also nothing special about the question ‘how?’ which entails that 
‘know how’ should be treated as a constituent in the syntactic structure, since ‘how?’ occurs with 
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many other verbs, without combining with the verb and ceasing to act as a question-word (for 
example: ‘wonder’, ‘asked’, ‘inquired’). It is also the case that there are many knowledge ascriptions 
using the word ‘how’ which are straight-forwardly propositional, such as (7).From the point of view 
of syntax then, there is no reason for treating ‘knows how’ as a special kind of knowledge ascription, 
rather than as a kind of interrogative knowledge on a par with knowledge-wh.  
The similarity of knowledge-how with knowledge-wh is underlined by the possibility of 
substitution of a how-phrase for another wh-question and the possibility of conjunction of how and 
wh-questions. When one has knowledge which can be ascribed using ‘know how’, it will often be the 
case that one could also ascribe this knowledge using other question words. For example, when you 
know how to catch a ball, you have all kinds of knowledge of answers. You know whether the ball 
will fall ahead or behind of you, you know when to lift your hands and grasp the ball, and you know 
why to not snatch at the ball.66 Knowledge how ascriptions are tied up with knowledge-wh. It is also 
possible to conjoin ‘know how’ with other question words, which offers further evidence that ‘how’ 
is functioning as a question word. For example, it sounds fine to say: 
8) Make sure your whole family knows when and how to call emergency telephone 
numbers.67 
If know-how ascriptions were ascribing a kind of knowledge distinct from knowledge-wh, it 
would be difficult to see how substitution or conjunction could occur.  
These are interesting results, since they undercut a linguistic motivation for Anti-
Intellectualism. However, we might think that even if we think that there are no syntactic grounds 
for holding that knowledge-how is non-propositional, we could still hold that knowledge-how is non-
propositional. For example, Adrian Moore makes extremely similar observations to Stanley and 
Williamson about the syntax of knowledge-how, but contends that there remain good philosophical 
grounds for thinking that there is a non-propositional species of knowledge.68 
The argument which Stanley and Williamson seem to be appealing to in order to turn the 
uniformity of knowledge how ascriptions into an argument for Intellectualism seems to be 
something along the following lines:  
P1) Knowledge-wh ascriptions are ascriptions of propositional knowledge 
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P2) Knowledge-how ascriptions are relevantly similar to knowledge-wh ascriptions 
P3) Relevantly similar ascriptions refer to the same type of entity  
C) Knowledge-how ascriptions are ascriptions of propositional knowledge69 
The Anti-Intellectualist ought to agree on the fact that knowledge-wh ascribes propositional 
knowledge because of the plausibility of substituting knowledge-wh for knowledge-that (P1). The 
similar structures of know-how and know-wh are fairly clear in the syntactic structure of the relevant 
ascriptions, as well as in the possibility of conjunction and substitution so that (P2) cannot be easily 
controverted either. 
The important question then, is why we ought to think that relevantly similar ascriptions 
should have similar analyses (P3). One reason for favouring a uniform account is that the presence of 
a uniform type of knowledge behind these ascriptions gives a nice explanation of the use of the 
uniform construction. By the Anti-Intellectualist’s lights, the uniformity of the structure of 
ascriptions might seem to be an aberration since she thinks that some knowledge-how ascriptions 
refer to a completely different kind of knowledge.  Another reason for favouring uniformity would 
be to appeal to the methodological principle that uniform linguistic constructions should (all other 
things being equal) be taken to be generated from a uniform underlying form.70 This principle seems 
to be what Stanley and Williamson are appealing to when they say that their position ought to be 
the default account of knowledge how.71  
It is worth pointing out that the uniformity argument might be used as a motivation for a 
number of different Intellectualist analyses, because it says nothing about what kind of answers 
someone who knows how knows. 72, meaning that Stanley and Williamson have not yet provided us 
with an account of knowledge how. 
2.3. The Compositional Argument 
It is all very well to contend that the grammatical structure of the sentences used to ascribe 
knowledge how in English suggests that they ascribe knowledge of propositions, but this will not 
convince supporters of Anti-Intellectualism. A propositional account of knowledge how must be 
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philosophically adequate. Stanley and Williamson fill out the analogy with knowledge-wh by 
appealing to the semantics of embedded questions to get an account of what work the ‘how’ clause 
does, which they use to propose an account of knowledge how. 
According to contemporary linguistics, the schematic phrase ‘S knows how to φ’ has the 
following structure: 
9) S knows [how PRO to φ t] 
Where brackets signal a clausal boundary, PRO is an unpronounced pronoun and t is the 
trace of movement left by the movement of the question word. In this picture, the complement 
clause of knowledge is an embedded question (‘how to φ?’) which according to standard accounts of 
the semantics of questions, denotes the set of its true answers.73 Stanley and Williamson’s original 
contribution which goes beyond Brown and Hintikka’s considerations of syntax is to propose that a 
semantic analysis of this embedded question will shed light on what it is that we know when we 
know how to do something. 
In order to do this, they need to be able to offer an interpretation of the three elements of 
the embedded question: the question-word ‘how’, the unpronounced pronoun, and the infinitive. 
It is fairly intuitive that different question-words pick out different kinds of answers: 
‘where?’ quantifies over places, ‘who?’ over people, ‘why?’ over reasons and so on. Stanley and 
Williamson claim that the question ‘how?’ quantifies over ways, as in the questions: ‘how did he 
look?’ ‘how do you get there?’74 They claim that in relation to infinitives such as those which we find 
in the interesting class of knowledge-how ascription, ‘how?’ quantifies over ways of engaging in 
actions. They flesh out this contention by accepting a Davidsonian account of adverbs of action 
which construes a way of engaging in an action as a property of the token event which is an agent’s 
doing something.75 So, the question-word ‘how’ restricts our attention to ways of engaging in 
actions, which for Stanley and Williamson are properties of token events. 
The interpretation of PRO and the infinitive are a little more difficult as each element can 
function in two ways. When PRO occurs in an untensed clause outside of an embedded question, it 
refers back to  the subject of the main clause, but in untensed clauses in embedded questions it can 
be also read in an arbitrary fashion, akin to ‘one’. Take the following examples: 
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10) Hannahi wants PROi to behave 
11) John knows how PROarb to behave at a funeral 
Whereas PRO in (10) can only be read as referring back to Hannah, in (11) the arbitrary 
reading of PRO is available. What John knows is how to behave oneself at a funeral.76  
Infinitives can also be interpreted in two ways, as expressing either conditional or deontic 
modal force. Consider: 
12) Hannah wondered where to find an Italian newspaper 
13) John asked his host where to sit 
In (12), Hannah is wondering where she could get an Italian newspaper. By contrast, in (13) 
John’s question is not where he might sit, which is presumably obvious to him, since he can see the 
chairs around the table, but where he ought to sit. What he wants to know is where the host has 
decided to put him.  
These different readings offer four interpretative possibilities for infinitival embedded 
questions, which Stanley and Williamson then apply to knowledge-how ascriptions, obtaining the 
following possible analyses of the generic ‘S knows how to φ’: 
 Deontic force Possibility force 
PRO-referring to subject of 
main clause 
S knows how she ought to φ (a) S knows how she could φ (c) 
PRO-referring to arbitrary 
person 
S knows how one ought to φ (b) S knows how one could φ (d) 
 
They rightly point out that intuitively the deontic readings, (a) and (b) ascribe propositional 
knowledge, and therefore focus in on (c) as giving the paradigm reading for know-how ascriptions, 
presumably assuming that this reading can be simply extended to (d). 
Putting the interpretation of the question ‘how?’ together with reading (c), Stanley and 
Williamson claim that the embedded question [How PRO to φ t] ranges over ways in which the 
subject of PRO could φ. Going back to our example of the problematic kind of know-how, according 
to Stanley and Williamson, ‘S knows how to ride a bicycle’ should be understood as: S knows ways in 
which she could ride a bicycle.  
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This leads us onto a final difficulty in the interpretation of embedded questions. As we saw 
with example (3), some embedded questions have a ‘mention-some’ reading, relating the agent to 
just one answer to the embedded question, whereas others have a ‘mention-all’ reading, in which 
the agent is related to all of the contextually relevant answers to the question.77 Stanley and 
Williamson argue that typical know-how ascriptions will have the mention-some reading, as it is 
sufficient for normal communicative purposes to inform others that the agent knows some way of 
doing something.78  
Putting these considerations together we get the following interpretation of the schematic 
knowledge-how ascription: 
(S&W1): S knows how to φ if and only if for some contextually relevant way, w, which is a 
way for her to φ, she knows that w is a way for her to φ. 
2.4. Extensions to the Account  
Stanley and Williamson are keen to point out that their account is not simply suggested by 
results in linguistics, but is also able to explain all of the features of knowledge how which have led 
philosophers to claim that it is a special kind of knowledge. In order to do this, they propose a 
number of extensions to their account to deal with some relevant differences between knowledge 
how and central examples of propositional knowledge.79 I will focus in on three extensions which 
make significant differences to their account. 
2.4.1. The Expression of Knowledge How 
The initial concern which I used to motivate interest in knowing how was the tension 
between the intuitive idea that when you know, you know something, and the fact that in central 
cases of knowledge how, agents cannot provide satisfying gloss on what it is that they know. Stanley 
and Williamson have offered us an account the object of knowledge how, but their account will be 
somewhat implausible without an account of how this knowledge can be expressed. 
A first point is that it would be too demanding to expect full and precise linguistic expression 
from knowledge how. There are plentiful examples of knowledge-that, where an agent can only 
express her knowledge using indexicals or demonstratives. I might be unable to describe the precise 
location of my pain but still know that it hurts here. Stanley and Williamson claim that the 
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problematic kind of knowledge how will similarly be expressed using demonstratives.80 To make this 
plausible, they offer an example of knowing of how other people act. For example, if Hannah rides a 
bicycle in a particularly strange manner, I might express my knowledge of how Hannah cycles by 
saying “Hannah cycles like that,” whilst pointing at her cycling, without needing to describe her 
performance in precise linguistic terms. They claim that in this kind of demonstrative reference, the 
speaker uses the mechanism of deferred reference to exploit the presence of a sample which 
instantiates a property to refer to the property itself. By pointing to a stretch of Hannah’s strange 
cycling, I can successfully refer to the strange way in which she cycles itself, just as I can use a sample 
of a colour to refer to the colour itself when I say “my mother hates that colour.” 81 
If this mechanism of deferred reference works in the case of knowing how someone else 
does something, it can presumably be used by an agent to express her knowledge of how to do 
various things. In a sense this is just the intuitive point that we can sometimes show our knowledge 
rather than expressing it. To illustrate this point Stanley gives the example of a punch-drunk boxer, 
temporarily unable to describe or explain his way of beating a southpaw, expressing his knowledge-
how by saying “this is the way I fight against a southpaw,” and then demonstrating the way by 
engaging in that way of fighting.82 The thought is that we can, in general, express our knowledge of 
how to do things by pointing at ourselves while engage in the appropriate activity and saying 
something along the lines of “this is my way of φ-ing,” which thereby identifies the way in which we 
are φ-ing by deferred ostension. 
Although their account of the expression of knowledge how is not foregrounded in their 
initial discussion, the success of deferred ostension is important for their view, since expressibility is 
a central feature of propositional knowledge, and the appeal to deferred ostension is the only 
response which they have to a sceptic who offers cases in which it is in question whether the agent 
possesses knowledge of ways. 
2.4.2. Practical and Non-Practical Knowledge-How 
One worry we might have about Stanley and Williamson’s account of knowledge how is that 
it over-unifies the class of knowledge ascribed with the words ‘know’ + ‘how’. Literally interpreted 
(S&W1) claims that there are no important epistemological differences between knowing how to 
cycle and knowing how Trotsky died. But there is surely some distinction here: one is a kind of 
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knowledge which we find philosophically problematic; the other not. What Stanley and Williamson 
need is an account of which kind of proposition is in play when we know how to do something to 
distinguish knowing how from other kinds of propositional knowledge. 
Presumably part of the answer to this concern is that Stanley and Williamson think that 
knowing how to φ is not just knowing that my φ-ing has certain properties, or is done in a certain 
manner. Knowing that my way of walking is slowly is presumably not the relevant kind of knowledge 
how. Rather we are interested in knowing a method for doing something; the way in which I can 
engage in some action. This point is slightly obscured by the example of knowing that Hannah rides a 
bicycle in a funny way, in which the way known is not a method but a style of acting, but in later 
work Stanley is clearer that he has knowledge of method or procedure in mind. For example in 
discussing Hawley’s account of showing how, Stanley observes: 
“If someone shows me how to do something, before I learn how to do it from their 
demonstration, I must acquire a practical way of thinking of that method of doing it.”83  
The restriction to knowledge of methods will not do all of the work needed, however 
because someone could know a method without knowing how in the relevant sense. Someone who 
has read a manual knows the methods by which one can engage in various skateboarding tricks, but 
they do not yet know how to skateboard in the relevant sense.  
Stanley and Williamson flesh out the special character of the interesting kind of by 
constructing a case for a special mode of presentation. They point out that it is possible for an agent 
to know a way of doing something, but not know how to do it. Consider the following two 
sentences: 
14) Hannah knows that that way is a way for her to ride a bicycle. 
15) Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle. 
If Hannah has not learnt to cycle but is watching John cycle, then (14) will be true but (15) 
false. Since the embedded clauses in these sentences express the same proposition under Stanley 
and Williamson’s analysis, 84 an explanation of the difference in the truth value of the sentences 
needs to appeal to the proposition in question being entertained under two different moves of 
presentation. According to Stanley and Williamson, in (14) the proposition that a certain way is a 
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way to cycle is being entertained under a demonstrative mode of presentation, whereas in (15) it is 
being entertained under what they call a practical mode of presentation.  
They are quite sketchy about what they take practical ways of thinking or propositions to 
consist in, seeming happy to contend that Frege puzzles such as that arising from (14) and (15) 
provide an existence proof for them.85 We might worry that this sketchiness about the notion of a 
practical mode of presentation makes their account rather vacuous, since it includes a non-trivial 
unexplained term.86 They try to put this worry to one side by pointing out that their purpose is not to 
reductively analyse knowledge how in purely propositional terms, but to show that all knowledge-
how is knowledge-that; that whatever knowledge we have when we know how, is propositional. In a 
sense, they agree with Brown that there is a distinction between two kinds of propositional 
knowledge: normal knowledge of propositions and knowledge of propositions associated with 
practical ways of thinking.  
Adding the practical mode of presentation into their account of knowledge how, we get the 
following analysis:  
(S&W2): S knows how to φ if and only if for some contextually relevant way, w, which is a 
way for her to φ, there is a practical mode of presentation m, such that she knows under m 
that w is a way for her to φ. 
2.4.3. Knowing How to Act 
Another feature of knowledge how which we might use to put pressure on Stanley and 
Williamson’s account is the Rylean idea that knowledge how is directly exercised in action. If we take 
Ryle’s discussion of the role of knowledge how seriously, then we will think that an Intellectualist 
account ought to be able to offer an account of how to stop Ryle’s regress , and should explain the 
connection between knowledge how and practical intelligence.  
To stop Ryle’s regress, they appeal to Ginet’s point that propositional knowledge can be 
exercised in action without a distinct act of contemplation: 
“I exercise (or manifest) my knowledge that one can get the door open by turning the know 
and pushing it (as well as my knowledge that there is a door there) by performing that 
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operation quite automatically as I leave the room; and I may do this, of course, without 
formulating (in my mind or out loud) that proposition or any other proposition.”87  
The thought here is that propositional knowledge is frequently exercised in action, without 
the agent needing to consider the content of this knowledge, meaning that Ryle’s argument against 
the Intellectualist fails to get off the ground. This consideration is also apt to be seen as a general 
account of how knowledge is put into action. For example, Stanley counters Ryle’s discussion of the 
Intellectualist’s need for a ‘schizophrenic broker’ to connect knowledge of propositions with action 
with the claim that propositional knowledge can be put into action by automatic, domain-general 
modular systems of triggering representations.88 
In order to explain the connection between knowledge how and intelligent action they 
appeal to the connection between first-person knowledge and dispositions to act. Stanley and 
Williamson claim that: 
“Thinking of a person as oneself entails being disposed to behave in certain ways, or form 
certain beliefs, given relevant input from that person. Similarly thinking of a place as here 
entails being disposed in certain ways, or form certain beliefs, given relevant input from that 
place. Analogously, thinking of a way under a practical mode of presentation undoubtedly 
entails the possession of certain complex dispositions. It is for this reason that there are 
intricate connections between knowing how and dispositional states.”89 
Here the idea seems to be that the dispositions which Ryle relates to knowing how are real 
but are grounded in and explained by knowledge of ways under a practical mode of presentation. 
Just as thinking of an object as myself readies me to do certain things, thinking of a method as a way 
to do something readies me to use that method when it is appropriate to do so.90 
2.5. Conclusion 
In this section, I have set out two arguments for Intellectualism, which Stanley and 
Williamson present as offering justification for their account of knowledge how. The uniformity 
argument appeals to the syntactic uniformity of knowledge how with knowledge-wh to argue for an 
Intellectualist treatment of knowledge how. The compositional argument is more positive, putting 
forward an account of knowledge how taking off from the compositional semantics of knowledge 
how ascriptions. From these arguments Stanley and Williamson propose a number of extensions, 
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which aim to explain those features of knowledge how which are on the face of it tricky for the 
Intellectualist to account for. In the next section, I will consider Stanley and Williamson’s use of 
evidence from syntax and semantics, and consider whether linguistics is an appropriate tool to solve 
philosophical problems. 
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3. Assessing Linguistics-First 
We have seen that Stanley and Williamson offer two arguments for Intellectualism, which 
rely heavily on the claims which contemporary linguistics makes about ascriptions of knowledge with 
an interrogative clause. Such reliance on linguistics in giving both the evidential ground and 
philosophical detail of a view is unusual, a point of which they are aware of, but which they seem to 
think counts in their favour. In summing up their view they say:  
“We take our view of ascriptions of knowledge-how to be the default position. From a 
linguistic perspective, very little is special about ascriptions of knowledge-how. It is hard to 
motivate singling them out for special treatment from the rest of a family of related 
constructions. Our view of ascriptions of knowledge-how is the analysis reached on full 
consideration of these constructions by theorists unencumbered by relevant philosophical 
prejudices.”91 
There are a couple of points in this quote which demonstrate the extent to which Stanley 
and Williamson’s project self-consciously rests results from linguistics. They describe their analysis as 
a view of ascriptions of knowledge-how, not of knowledge how itself. Doing this presumably means 
that they think that the way we ascribe knowledge offers a clear picture of the nature of the 
knowledge in question. In a similar vein, they claim that their analysis ought to be the default view of 
knowledge how because it is reached by consideration of the views of linguists lacking in 
philosophical baggage. They seem to be proposing that a legitimate way of giving an account of 
some phenomenon is to consider the results from linguistics first, and then only supplement or 
revise these views if the linguists’ views break down and require special philosophical treatment. We 
might call this approach a Linguistics-First approach to philosophy. Whereas many philosophers start 
inquiry by considering language to get a grip on the terms of inquiry, on this approach results from 
linguistics can equally mark the end of inquiry, because it can offer sufficient evidence to settle the 
question of then nature of the phenomenon under discussion.92 
In this section, I will consider the relevance of the linguistic evidence to knowledge how, as a 
way of assessing whether linguistics-first is a legitimate approach. In the first section I will consider 
some prominent criticisms of Stanley and Williamson’s methodology from both philosophical 
naturalists who think that they neglect empirical evidence, and sceptics about the linguistic 
evidence, and sketch out Stanley’s defence of Linguistics-First. With this defence in mind, in the 
second and third sections I will turn to the compositional and uniformity arguments to assess what 
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support (S&W2) can legitimately claim from the linguistics literature. A key claim of the 
compositional argument is that (S&W2) is entailed by the correct semantics for knowledge how 
ascriptions. The claim of entailment is overblown: the analysis relies on various controversial 
philosophical assumptions in both setting up and defending the account. Despite these controversial 
commitments, their account might still be defensible if the uniformity argument entails the truth of 
Intellectualism, and their analysis is the most defensible version of that view. However, the 
uniformity argument is also controversial, since focusing on the linguistic uniformity of knowledge-
how with knowledge-wh ignores relevant differences between the two kinds of knowledge. This 
combination of linguistic similarity and non-linguistic difference can be adequately explained by a 
range of positions. 
3.1. Naturalistic Scepticism 
Alva Noë and Michael Devitt are clearest in setting out the Naturalistic challenge to Stanley 
and Williamson’s methodology.93 They claim that Stanley and Williamson miss the point of the 
question about the nature of knowledge how because language is not relevant to philosophically 
significant questions about the nature of the mind. 
Noë seems to think that Stanley and Williamson have radically confused the nature of the 
problem, countering Ryle’s proposal about the nature of knowledge how with a counter-proposal 
about the nature of the sentences which we use to ascribe knowledge how. He contends that: 
“The biggest problem with [Stanley and Williamson’s methodology] is that it directs our 
attention to considerations about language (how people talk), when theorists of mind (in 
philosophy or cognitive science) are interested in human nature and the nature of mind.”94 
If the question they are answering is one about language, then according to Noë, Stanley 
and Williamson have missed the point of Ryle’s discussion, which is about the nature of the mind, 
and not how we describe the mind. This is not to say that he thinks that Intellectualism is a trivial 
view: he points out that it is a “well-entrenched framework for the study of the mind, especially in 
linguistics and developmental psychology.”95 It is just that if Stanley and Williamson are attempting 
to show that the substantive thesis about the mind is true, they ought to look to the philosophy of 
mind and empirical science, rather than just to the structure of language. Noë suggests that an 
Intellectualist approach to the mind will not be successful, because it will ignore the situated 
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embodied, and phenomenological aspects of practical intelligence, and suggests that a situated 
approach to cognition is better suited to account for the nature of knowledge how.96 
Devitt agrees that Stanley and Williamson’s approach to the nature of knowledge how is 
methodologically backward, describing it as putting linguistics before considerations of how the 
world is; a move which he considers to be inappropriate given our greater knowledge of the world 
than of language.97 He claims that a naturalistic interest in knowing how should be concerned with 
the way in which it is pertinent to psychological explanation. To make this point, he observes that 
there seems to be a substantive explanatory gap between knowledge-how and knowledge-that in 
empirical science. Cognitive ethologists often ascribe knowledge how to species to which they would 
not ascribe knowledge of propositions (a point also made by Noë in discussing animal know-how), 
and psychologists make a theoretically significant distinction between procedural and declarative 
knowledge, which Devitt claims matches up with the distinction between knowledge-how and 
knowledge-that.98  
The general point of the naturalistic sceptics is that Stanley and Williamson confuse the 
significance of the question which they are addressing, and in so doing ignore the importance of 
other evidence which might be brought to bear on the question of the nature of knowledge how, 
especially that from the philosophy of mind and empirical science.  
3.2. Scepticism about Language 
Sceptics about language take a more negative approach, arguing that Stanley and 
Williamson’s methodology is not decisive because appealing to language is not sufficient to resolve 
the philosophical issue, either because of the problem of cross-linguistic diversity, or the failure of 
language to accurately represent the world. 
Ian Rumfitt points out that although Stanley and Williamson have located some knowledge-
how ascriptions in English which the best semantic theory construes as relating knowers to 
embedded questions, there are other languages in which knowledge-how ascriptions do not 
obviously come out as relating the knower to an embedded question.99 In French, for example, there 
are two constructions for ascribing knowledge how: the embedded question construction which 
Stanley and Williamson discuss [verb + question word + infinitive] and the direct infinitival 
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construction [verb + infinitive], which their analysis does not obviously apply to, since it does not 
involve an interrogative.  
For example, we might say of Pierre when he has learnt a way to cross over a particular 
river: 
1) Pierre sait comment traverser le fleuve en nagent 
Pierre knows how to cross the river 
 Whereas if we wanted to say that he just knows how to swim, we would say: 
2) Pierre sait nager 
Pierre knows how to swim 
 Rumfitt points out that this distinction is not merely down to a superfluity of grammatical 
constructions, because there is a systematic difference in perceived meaning between “il sait nager,” 
and “il sait comment nager,” meaning that sentences like the first cannot be construed as shorthand 
for the second. French is not a linguistic outlier in this matter: Romance languages generally have a 
non-interrogative construction for ascribing practical knowledge, and some languages – notably 
Russian – reserve a different intellectual verb for that construction. This difference in construction, 
and perhaps also in meaning also shows up in English with ‘learn’. We say both that someone “learnt 
to ride a bicycle,” and that they “learnt how to ride a bicycle.” 100 
Rumfitt’s point is that if linguistic data, and in particular the best contemporary semantic 
theory is relevant to philosophical issues, then given the existence of the different grammatical 
constructions for knowledge how ascriptions the evidence for Intellectualism is mixed.101 Although 
there are many know-how ascriptions to which contemporary semantics gives a propositional 
treatment, there are many to which it would not. Rumfitt raises the possibility that the best way of 
explaining these two constructions would be to posit an ambiguity in knowledge how ascriptions 
between propositional and activity-relating knowledge.102 His point about cross-linguistic diversity in 
construction could also be seen as making the broader methodological point that treating evidence 
from linguistics as decisive evidence in philosophical disputes runs the risk of importing accidental 
features of a language into a philosophical account.103 
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 Barbara Abbott expresses a more direct methodological scepticism about the use of 
language by pointing out that the use of linguistic evidence to solve philosophical problems has a 
number of systematic problems.104 Firstly, linguistic evidence on some matter may not be fully clear, 
because linguists are not agreed on the terms of analysis, or the significance of the data. Although 
Stanley and Williamson claim to take standard results in linguistics, there are a number of linguistic 
grounds for questioning the specifics of their view.105 Secondly, language is efficient, in that it uses 
the same grammatical constructions to express a number of different relations. For example, that-
clauses are fairly all-purpose, being used to refer to facts, propositions, events and utterances. This 
efficiency means that it would be naïve to think that grammatical constructions are entirely 
transparent to the entities to which they refer.106 Thirdly, language may actually misrepresent the 
world. Although the distinctions which occur in language are likely significant, there is no reason to 
suppose that we must not introduce new distinctions to capture the relevant features of the world. 
For example, the word ‘pain’ plausibly expresses two distinct states: emotional pain and physical 
pain, which we cannot distinguish on merely linguistic grounds.107 Presumably, part of the job of 
empirical science is to introduce such new terminology to add distinctions to language when it 
makes a mistake like this.108  
Whereas the naturalistic sceptics point out the importance of evidence other than that from 
language, Rumfitt and Abbott question the reliability of linguistic evidence itself, given cross-
linguistic diversity, and the fact that language is not transparent to the entities which it refers to. 
3.3. Stanley’s Defence of Linguistics First 
 In Know How, Stanley tries to assuage the worries of both kinds of sceptic. In response to 
the naturalistic sceptic, he sets out what he takes to be the connection between knowledge how 
ascriptions and knowledge how itself, and argues that his account is compatible with the relevant 
empirical evidence. In response to the data from other languages, he argues that it is possible to give 
a semantics for the French [know + infinitive] construction which is compatible with his variety of 
Intellectualism.  
In response to the naturalist’s charge that the linguistics-first methodology misses the point 
by focusing on language rather than the world, Stanley points out that the linguistics literature can 
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be read as a contribution toward metaphysical inquiry, just as philosophical accounts of the nature 
of states can be read as contributions to the linguistics literature.109 Excepting cases of context-
dependence or self-reference, the schema [“S” is true if and only if S] holds true, meaning that an 
analysis of a class of ascriptions can be read as an account of the nature of the states which they 
refer to, and vice versa. As Stanley points out “discussions of semantics are often in fact discussions 
of metaphysics carried out in the formal mode.”110 Since we can read off metaphysical claims from 
the semantics literature, according to Stanley, Noë’s charge that using linguistic evidence changes 
the question to one about language is baseless. This defence of the methodology also seems to be 
aimed at Abbott’s scepticism about the clarity of language. According to Stanley, we can gain insight 
into the folk concept of knowledge how by doing the compositional semantics, which is then the 
basis for the scientific inquiry into knowledge how.111 
In response to the specific empirical concerns which Devitt and Noë raise, Stanley claims 
that the cases which they draw attention to raise pose no problem for (S&W2).112 According to 
Stanley, it is quite compatible with this account that the knowledge how possessed by non-human 
animals and the knowledge ascribed by psychologists under the head of procedural knowledge is 
just propositional knowledge.113 It just is a different kind of propositional knowledge from the 
examples which have been central in the philosophical literature. Certainly it is not accessible to 
consciousness, subject to the KK principle, or fully expressible in language; in his view, so much the 
worse for these features as necessary conditions on knowledge.114 On Stanley’s view, propositional 
knowledge does not require the features of the traditional conception of propositional knowledge 
(see §1.1). Rather, on his view propositional knowledge is just the possession of information 
together with the ability to use that information to guide action.115  
In response to the data from French, Stanley offers a semantic analysis for the relevant 
construction which is consistent with his account of knowledge how.116 According to Stanley, the 
problem with the [know + infinitive] construction for (S&W2) is that it ascribes knowledge how but 
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does not have the embedded question construction, on which Stanley and Williamson base their 
account. To offer an analysis of the [know + infinitive] construction, Stanley posits two 
unpronounced elements in the construction: an unpronounced pronoun, PRO, and a free variable, x, 
which ranges over ways of acting. This gives the following structure for the problematic savoir faire 
construction:  
3)  Pierrei sait PROi nager x 
Where PRO refers back to the subject of the main clause, and nager is read as expressing 
conditional modality along the lines of analysis (c) we get something like the following analysis: 
4) “Pierre sait nager” is true if and only if Pierre knows that he can swim in way x117 
Which is clearly an ascription of propositional knowledge. Stanley then offers a number of 
possible explanations for the felt difference in meaning between ‘savoir faire’ and ‘savoir comment 
faire’, appealing to pragmatic or semantic factors, the details of which will not concern us.118 In 
summing up, Stanley observes that: 
“It is simple to give the embedded question semantics for languages in which knowledge 
how is expressed with a bare infinitive. Even if we take the apparent structure of language 
such as French at face value, where “savoir” takes an infinitive complement, one can easily 
give my favoured account of the meaning of ascriptions of knowing how.”119 
Having sketched out the state of the dialectic about the methodology used in defence of 
(S&W2), I will now turn to the compositional and uniformity arguments, and assess how the critical 
points we have discussed above affect the force of these arguments. 
3.4. The Compositional Argument 
In places, Stanley and Williamson make it sound like their view is simply obviously true when 
one considers the syntax and semantics of knowledge how ascriptions. For example, Stanley claims 
that: 
“A straightforward application of the standard application of the standard syntax and 
semantics for embedded questions yields the above account [S&W2] of knowing how.”120  
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While it is true that their account is suggested by the standard syntax and semantics of 
embedded questions it is both false and misleading to claim that (S&W2) is simply entailed by views 
in linguistics.121 False, because the analysis includes the idea of a practical mode of presentation, 
which has no absolutely no basis in linguistics, and misleading, because in general compositional 
semantics must be interpreted within a philosophical picture to yield a metaphysical analysis of the 
entities referred to.  
The idea that their analysis is that which might be arrived at by unencumbered linguists 
draws our attention away from the philosophical assumptions which they make in settling up their 
picture. Stanley and Williamson are by their own admission not actually giving an account of all 
know-how ascriptions, but only of the practical kind of knowledge how which Anti-Intellectualists 
are interested in. In order to pick out this class of ascriptions, they need to offer an account of what 
distinguishes it from other kinds of knowledge ascribed with the words ‘know’ + ‘how’. They need 
the idea of a practical mode of presentation in order to mark out this class of knowledge, but this 
condition on their analysis is explicitly philosophical in nature. 
Even with the restriction to the special mode of presentation in place, it is not possible to 
just remove the quotation marks and get an account of the knowledge in question, because in 
general semantics must be interpreted within a philosophical picture to get to a metaphysical 
analysis. This is certainly true of (S&W2). In interpreting the semantics of the how clause, they rely 
on a Davidsonian picture of adverbs, which commits them to a whole host of assumptions about the 
nature of agency, and how adverbs function. Similarly in choosing between a mention-all and 
mention-some reading of the embedded question, they appeal to philosophical considerations 
about communicative purposes.122 
Additionally, they think that establishing that the complement clause of know-how is a 
proposition is sufficient to establish that the relation is a propositional-knowledge relation.123 
Although this assumption might make sense if we think that knowledge is the most general factive 
mental state, 124 or take Stanley’s austere picture of propositional knowledge, it could easily be 
challenged by proponents of the traditional conception of propositional knowledge. The importance 
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of this picture of propositional knowledge is underlined when we notice that it is also required for 
Stanley’s claim that procedural and animal knowledge is propositional, since neither species of 
knowledge possesses any of the properties of the traditional conception.125  
They also assume a certain picture of the exercise of propositional knowledge in taking on 
Ginet’s point that knowledge can be put into action without conscious consideration. As I pointed 
out above, this appeal is not simply a point against Ryle’s regress argument; it is a general account of 
how knowledge is put into action. Stanley makes the commitments of this idea particularly clear by 
explicitly appealing to the Fodorian idea that knowledge is put into action by modular 
mechanisms.126 Assuming that knowledge is put into action automatically brings with it a host of 
assumptions about its role in mental life. 
These philosophical assumptions about the nature of the mind and knowledge are required 
to get their favoured account of knowledge out of the semantics, and render it plausible, but they 
load their view down with philosophical commitments and show that their view is not simply 
entailed by results from linguistics. These assumptions could easily be challenged by an Anti-
Intellectualist, particularly given that the Davidsonian and Fodorian pictures of the mind might be 
thought to have Intellectualist assumptions built in to them. For example, the Davdisonian picture of 
adverbs endorses the idea that action is an effect of intellectual operations, which is exactly what 
Ryle is arguing against,127 and a Fodorian picture of modularity might be thought to bring with it a 
computational picture of the mind.  
Since analyses derived from compositional semantics are not independent of philosophical 
assumptions, and surface structure need not be the final word in analysis, we might well ask 
whether an Anti-Intellectualist semantics for knowledge how ascriptions could be solely motivated 
by philosophical considerations. If Stanley does not tie his account to the ‘apparent structure of 
language’ then the Anti-Intellectualist need not either. 
Stanley’s appeal to the truth schema certainly answers Noë’s charge that an analysis of 
know-how ascriptions misses the point, but it says nothing about in which direction we ought to 
read the truth schema.128 Stanley and Williamson read it from left to right, going from linguistics to 
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metaphysics via the philosophical assumptions detailed above, but it is equally legitimate to read the 
schema from right to left, motivating a linguistic analysis by a philosophical claim. In fact, Stanley 
himself does this in motivating his semantics for the savoir faire construction.129 To challenge Stanley 
and Williamson’s analysis of knowledge how, one need not be a sceptic about the relevance of 
language to philosophical issues; one must simply be willing to revise the semantics offered by 
linguistics in some cases, in response to non-linguistic sources of evidence.  
It certainly would be a worry if there were no possible semantics for knowledge how 
ascriptions which were compatible with the Anti-Intellectualist’s account,130 but there are several 
possible analyses available. One option is to follow Rumfitt’s suggestion that knowledge-how 
ascriptions in English are ambiguous between a propositional and activity-relating form of 
knowledge.131 This view seems to be fairly clearly suggested by the observation of the cross-linguistic 
distinction between the different grammatical constructions for ascribing knowledge how.132 
Certainly, this account would require a somewhat revisionary account of the syntax and semantics of 
some English know-how ascriptions, but if it is legitimate for Stanley to offer revisionary semantics, 
then it is legitimate for the Anti-Intellectualist to do so too. 
Rather than being a point in their favour, the interdependence of linguistic and philosophical 
considerations in fact plays against Stanley and Williamson’s account. Noting how many 
philosophical assumptions they make in their account of knowledge how opens up fresh lines of 
criticism, and weakens Stanley and Williamson’s grounds for claiming that (S&W2) is entailed by the 
relevant syntax and semantics. This interdependence also raises the possibility of the Anti-
Intellectualist motivating accounts of the semantics of knowledge how ascriptions from purely 
philosophical considerations. 
3.5. The Uniformity Argument 
Whether or not the compositional semantics given by linguists ought to be a decisive form of 
philosophical evidence, Stanley and Williamson can nonetheless claim support from the similarity of 
knowledge-how ascriptions with knowledge-wh ascriptions. This is the central claim of the 
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Uniformity argument, which claims that the syntactic uniformity of knowledge-how with knowledge-
wh shows that they express the same kind of relation. 
Above, I suggested that this argument has the following form: 
P1) Knowledge-wh ascriptions are ascriptions of propositional knowledge 
P2) Knowledge-how ascriptions are relevantly similar to knowledge-wh ascriptions 
P3) Relevantly similar ascriptions refer to the same type of entity  
C) Knowledge-how ascriptions are ascriptions of propositional knowledge 
A first point to consider is whether it is really so clear that the knowledge which is ascribed 
with embedded questions is universally propositional, as (P1) claims. Although in many cases there 
are obvious propositional substitutions for the embedded question, in other cases there are not. If I 
am watching Mo Farah sprint at the end of the 10,000 metres, I might say “Mo knows when to kick; 
that’s why he wins so many races.” There is no obvious propositional substitution for this ascription, 
because I am claiming that Mo’s know how enables him to sprint at the right time in an open-ended 
range of different situations, depending on what his competitors are doing.133  
Another reason for doubting (P1) is the existence of non-propositional theories of 
knowledge-wh. Schaffer and Stout have recently separately offered non-propositional theories of 
knowledge-wh in response to cases of convergent knowledge, in which an agent possesses knows-
wh in relation to one question, and not in relation to another, despite the fact that both questions 
have the same fact as their answer.134 Bengson and Moffett also doubt that knowledge-wh 
ascriptions express knowledge of propositions, instead claiming that they express knowledge of the 
objects of the question-words. In order to support (P1), Stanley and Williamson will have to offer a 
philosophical argument for the correctness of their preferred semantics for embedded questions, or 
defuse the problems which the critics pose.135 
 A more significant line of criticism is opened up by asking what is meant by ‘relevantly 
similar’ in (P2) and (P3). Stanley offers a number of criteria on which knowledge how and 
knowledge-wh ascriptions are similar, which are all broadly linguistic: appealing to syntactic 
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structure, conjunction, substitution and the uniform translation of the verb.136 The question is then 
whether it is plausible that linguistic uniformity translates into metaphysical uniformity. The appeal 
to linguistic methodology and simplicity are plausible in some cases, but they would not convince an 
Anti-Intellectualist. She might appeal here to Abbott’s point that although the presence of a 
linguistic distinction is likely non-arbitrary, and might well mark a significant distinction, the lack of a 
linguistic distinction does not entail the lack of significant division in the phenomena. We might find 
that language has failed to mark a relevant distinction, or that it marks it in the wrong place.137  
Once we go beyond the linguistic similarity in English, we find a number of pertinent 
dissimilarities between knowledge-how and knowledge-wh:  
i) Firstly, whereas knowledge-wh normally coheres to the traditional conception of 
knowledge (excepting the examples of non-propositional know-wh which we discussed 
above), knowledge how does not cohere to this conception, as we saw in §1.1.138 
 
ii) Secondly, as Ryle points out, the interesting kind of knowledge how has a close 
connection to action, which seems to be different in kind from the relation which 
knowledge of propositions has to action.  
 
iii) Thirdly, knowledge how and knowledge of propositions are frequently seen as distinct 
explanatory notions from the point of view of cognitive ethology and psychology, as 
Devitt points out.  
 
iv) Fourthly, it is not clear that the syntactic uniformity between knowledge-wh and 
knowledge how is cross-linguistically stable, since there are many languages which have 
different constructions or verbs for ascribing knowledge how, as Rumfitt points out. If 
we think that linguistic distinctions are indicative of metaphysical distinctions, then we 
should certainly think that this distinction is philosophically relevant.  
 
v) Finally, in fairly basic ways, the behaviour of knowledge how in relation to answers is 
dissimilar from that of other kinds of knowledge-wh. In cases of knowledge-wh, that an 
agent is unable to answer a question or answers it falsely is good evidence that they do 
not know the answer to the embedded question. However, knowledge-how is 
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compatible with both the inability to answer the embedded question and giving false 
descriptions of how to do something.139  
The similarity between the sentences used to ascribe knowledge how and those used to 
ascribe knowledge-wh is therefore confined to English constructions, and is contrasted with many 
dissimilarities between the knowledge concerned. Stanley and Williamson’s point in favour of their 
account is that they can explain why knowledge-how has attracted an embedded question 
construction, but limiting our attention to the embedded question construction neglects extremely 
relevant differences from knowledge-wh. We should want to explain the differences in the 
phenomena under consideration, alongside the similarities in the construction. This might be done in 
a number of different ways 
A propositionalist Intellectualist might stick with the traditional conception of knowledge, 
and argue that knowledge how is a kind of primitive or animal knowledge to explain its difference 
from standard know-that.140 Alternatively an Anti-Intellectualist could posit two kinds of knowledge 
to explain the dissimilarities between knowledge-how and -wh, and then give an explanation of why 
knowing how is knowledge to explain the syntactic uniformity. 141 Finally, accounts of knowledge-wh 
which posit non-propositional objects, such as Bengson and Moffett’s, would be able to give a non-
propositional account of the uniformity by arguing that all knowledge-wh is knowledge of the 
objects which the embedded questions refer to, meaning that knowledge how comes out as 
knowledge of ways.142 In fact, the only position which would have trouble explaining the syntactic 
similarity of knowledge-how with knowledge-wh is Praxism. The Praxist claims that the words ‘know’ 
+ ‘how’ are used to pick out ability states, a claim which is difficult to square with the fact that know-
how is picked out using the word ‘knowledge’. 
Like the compositional argument, the Uniformity argument directs our attention towards 
considerations from linguistics, and away from relevant differences between knowledge how and 
knowledge-wh. Once we notice that there are significant differences between these two kinds of 
knowledge, a number of different ways of explaining the uniform syntax of knowledge how 
ascriptions in English suggest themselves. 
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3.6. Conclusion 
 We ought to make a distinction between two ways of using language in philosophy: as a 
source of first-pass distinctions and insights into the phenomena in question, or as a source of 
decisive evidence about philosophical controversies. Where Stanley and Williamson have gone 
wrong is in taking compositional semantics and syntactic structure to be decisive evidence in the 
philosophical inquiry about the nature of knowledge how. It is certainly true that these 
considerations offer an important source of data about how we ascribe knowledge how, but they do 
not provide decisive evidence concerning its nature. Compositional semantics require interpretation 
within a philosophical picture, and can be independently motivated by philosophical considerations, 
meaning that the standard compositional semantics offered by linguists are not philosophically 
decisive. The syntactic uniformity of knowledge how with knowledge-wh, although initially striking, 
hides a number of important dissimilarities between knowledge-how and knowledge-wh which can 
be explained equally well by a variety of positions. It is not necessary to reject the usefulness of 
linguistic considerations in philosophical inquiry to reject Stanley and Williamson’s Intellectualism. 
The problem with Stanley and Williamson’s approach to knowledge how is not that they consider 
the structure of knowledge ascriptions, but that they only appeal to these considerations in 
motivating their account, neglecting other relevant considerations. 
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4. Knowing How to Use Counterexamples 
Whereas critics of Intellectualism have been keen to criticise the use of linguistic evidence, 
the use of counterexamples in the debate seems to be accepted by all parties. There are a few well-
established counterexamples to Anti-Intellectualism, which have been taken to show that the 
position is indefensible, most notably by Snowdon, Stanley and Williamson and Bengson and 
Moffett.143 Even those who take Ryle’s side feel the force of these counterexamples and the need to 
adequately respond to them.144 In this section, I will develop a picture of the use and justification of 
counterexamples in inquiry to try to show that many of the extant counterexamples need not bother 
the Anti-Intellectualist, and that even with those which she ought to take seriously, she has a 
number of dialectical moves available to her to respond. 
In the first section I will offer a schematic picture of what a counterexample is, and 
distinguish negative and positive uses of counterexamples. I will then set out a broad schema of the 
types of counterexample to Anti-Intellectualism. I then set out three concerns with these 
counterexamples. The first worry is that many of these intuitive judgements are not relevant to the 
issue at hand because they concern irrelevant senses of ability or knowledge how, and can be simply 
explained away. The second worry is that to claim that counterexamples refute a whole style of 
theory is to over-generalise by neglecting the variety of positions within that style of theory. Thirdly, 
I argue that although it is true that folk judgments endorse a gap between know-how and ability 
which Intellectualism can easily explain, sophisticated Rylean positions can do the same, meaning 
that the positions remain on par. 
4.1. What is a counterexample? 
In the abstract, counterexamples are a simple dialectical device. Interlocutor A makes a 
claim of the form ‘all Fs are Gs’, B points out an uncontroversial case in which an F is not a G, and A is 
given a reason to either retract her claim or to restate it in such a way as to avoid the problematic 
case. I will call this the negative use of counterexamples. The negative use of counterexamples in 
philosophical inquiry has a venerable lineage, going back to Plato’s early dialogues, where it is a tool 
for showing that the firmly-held beliefs of Socrates’ interlocutors universally give way to absurdity.145 
 Although the structure of a counterexample is rather simple, their use raises a number of 
problems. Firstly, there must be a clear and well-understood generalisation or analysis on the table, 
which can serve as the target of the counterexamples. Secondly, the interlocutors must share 
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sufficient intellectual common ground to agree about the case at issue.146 If B’s theoretical 
commitments mean that she simply rejects the description of the case, then it has done no work. 
Thirdly, it must be clear that the example latches onto a serious theoretical problem in the account, 
rather than being irrelevant, frivolous or incoherent. A taxidermy specimen does not provide a 
compelling counterexample to the claim that all cats are warm-blooded felines. Fourthly, a 
successful counterexample need be not the last word on some analysis.147 If a philosopher wants to 
restate her theory such that it avoids the counterexample, or thinks that we ought to revise our 
judgement about the case because her theory has virtues outweighing the cost of the revision, then 
she may legitimately do so.148  
 Alongside this negative use of counterexamples, there is also a positive use of examples as a 
way of justifying philosophical theories. We can perhaps see this most clearly in post-Gettier 
epistemology, where it would be easy to read the literature as consisting in a series of theories 
generated to deal with counterexamples.149 The most charitable reading of this kind of dialectic sees 
it as appealing to the ideal of reflective equilibrium.150 According to this picture of philosophical 
justification it is one of the goals of a theory that it be able to explain the well-established 
judgements of the folk by setting them within a defensible theoretical background picture. This does 
not mean that the theory must be solely driven by folk judgements, since many folk judgments will 
not be consistent with other folk judgements or indeed with the background framework, but that 
coherence with generally held judgements is a good methodological principle for developing 
philosophical theories  
4.2. Counterexamples to Anti-Intellectualism 
There are two kinds of counterexample to the Anti-Intellectualist analysis of knowledge how 
in terms of capacity: cases of agents who know how to do something which they cannot do, and 
cases of agents who can do something which they do not know how to do, which challenge the 
necessity and sufficiency of the Anti-Intellectualist analysis of knowledge-how respectively. 
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4.2.1.  Unable Knowers  
There is an easy formula to construct unable knowers – simply take someone who clearly 
knows how to do something, and change the details of the case so that they cannot engage in the 
activity in question. There are three ways in which these cases are filled out: 
i) Take someone who knows how to do something, and remove the bodily capacity 
required for the exercise of that knowledge how. Intuitively, the ability has been 
removed but the knowledge how remains. For example, we might take a cyclist, and 
cut off their leg so that they cannot cycle although they still know how to cycle.151  
ii) Alternatively we might remove the external conditions for an exercise of knowledge 
how to the same effect. Presumably, I would still know how to make a Christmas 
pudding if the world’s sugar supply disappears, and I am no longer able to do so.152 
iii) A third way of removing an agent’s capacity to do something is to introduce an 
internal blocking condition which is activated whenever they try to do it. Susan 
knows how to pronounce ma’am to address the queen (‘Ma’am to rhyme with spam 
not Ma’am to rhyme with harm’) despite the fact that she’s too nervous in the royal 
presence to ever address the queen.153  
 
As well as these cases in which an agent’s ability is interfered with, there are cases of agents 
who have never been able to do what they know how to do. For example: 
iv) Teachers who are exemplar instructors about how to engage in some activity, but 
have never been able to engage in the activity themselves because it requires 
special physical training or practice.154 
v) Agents who know how to engage in some activity, although it is impossible for them 
to complete the activity successfully. For example a competent mathematician 
might know how to find the nth numeral of π because she knows the relevant 
algorithm, but she certainly cannot find the 1046 numeral because she lacks the time 
to do so.155 
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4.2.2. Able Non-knowers 
The other kind of counterexample concerns cases of agents who can do something, although 
they do not know how to do it. There are a number of different ways of constructing a case to get 
the combination of ability with lack of knowledge how: 
i) One might construct a case in which there is an opportunity for the exercise of 
ability which is unknown to the agent. For example, I might be able to get through a 
narrow rock opening, although I have not realised it yet. I am able to get through the 
gap, but do not know how to.156 
ii) We could also take an agent who does not know how to do something, and have 
them succeed in doing something by luck. For example, Sally might get caught in an 
avalanche, and get out by making swimming movements, thinking that she was in 
water, not knowing that those very movements were an effective way of getting out 
of an avalanche. She had the ability to get out of the avalanche, but did not know 
how to do so157  
iii) Finally, there are the everyday cases in which we learn how to do something as we 
go along. Building Ikea wardrobes are a good case in point. In such cases, 
presumably, we have the ability from the start, but only gain the know-how as we 
do along.158  
 
Having set out these examples, it is worth considering whether they address all Anti-
Intellectualist analyses. In §1.4 I made a distinction between Praxists, who think that knowing how to 
do something is having the ability to do it, and Ryleans, who think that knowing how to do 
something is a capacity that relates an agent to an activity. Although many of these 
counterexamples are presented to Ryle’s analysis, it is not clear that Ryle has a reductive account of 
know-how in his sights, and if he does then it is certainly not one in terms of simple ability. The 
extant counterexamples, however, are all concerned with the gap between know-how and ability. 
Hence these counterexamples will only be able to refute the Praxist, and do not obviously target 
either Ryle, or the Rylean who offers an account of knowledge how along Ryle’s lines.159 
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4.3. Counterexamples and Intuitive Judgement 
Having been presented with the counterexamples, a Praxist might well ask why she ought to 
take them seriously. The standard story is that counterexample judgments are justified because they 
are based on snap intuitive judgments, which are a reliable source of evidence. Such a story will be 
particularly tempting as an account of what distinguishes philosophical methodology from that of 
the natural sciences, since it gives philosophical inquiry a distinctive non-scientific form of 
evidence.160 
The appeal to intuition as the distinctive methodology of philosophy is extremely 
contentious. Although snap judgements more often than not correct,161 they are subject to 
systematic error in certain situations.162 This is a well-established psychological result, and recently 
its significance to philosophical inquiry has been highlighted by studies which purport to show the 
presence of bias in judgments philosophical examples. There is evidence that intuitions about 
philosophical cases are sensitive to irrelevant factors in the set-up of examples such as the way in 
which the cases were framed, the order in which they were presented, and whether they use 
emotive language.163 There is also evidence for interpersonal variation in intuitions based on class, 
education, culture, and gender, which raises the possibility that there are social biases in play.164  
There are a number of responses which one might make to this presence of bias in 
philosophical intuition. A Sceptic about intuitive judgement might use these results to reject the use 
of snap judgements as evidence in philosophical inquiry.165 A Rationalist about intuition might argue 
that there is a significant class of intuitions which have special rational status which can be 
distinguished from the snap judgements in the above experiments.166 A Nihilist about intuition might 
try to avoid the whole issue by contending that there is no evidence that there is a special evidential 
weight being given to snap judgements in philosophical inquiry (at least outside of post-Gettier 
epistemology).167 
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The sceptic’s response is much too quick – these studies do not show us that intuition is 
always unreliable; at most they show us that intuitive judgements are sometimes subject to error. I 
suggest that the explanation for this is that intuitive judgements about philosophical cases are 
examples of what Daniel Kahneman calls ‘fast thinking’: quick judgements which are based on 
association, question-substitution and heuristics. 168 That ‘fast’ thinking is subject to error is 
explained by the fact that it substitutes difficult for easy questions, and uses selective heuristics to 
come up with quick judgements rather than considering all of the available evidence. The presence 
of this kind of reasoning is not a specifically philosophical issue; fast thinking is ubiquitous in human 
life. The important question is not whether we should make use of this kind of judgement or desist 
from granting it philosophical credence (as the rationalist defender and experimentalist critic seem 
to think), but how to responsibly deal with intuitive judgements in philosophical inquiry.  
Two ways of using intuitive judgements suggest themselves. One might restrict the uses of 
intuitions to contexts in which snap judgments are reliable,169 or one might simply check up on 
intuitive judgement to ensure that they are not being led astray. In the absence of any compelling 
account of how to avoid biases, the latter seems to me to be the more promising option. Just as we 
ought to think twice about our practical reasoning in order to avoid biases such as loss-aversion,170 
we ought to think carefully about philosophical examples both hypothetical and real to make sure 
that our snap judgements stand up. This approach seems to reflect actual philosophical practice – 
judgements about cases are often carefully considered, rather than being taken as a given. This 
means that in a sense the nihilist is right that intuition does not play a foundational role in inquiry, 
since arguments are used to back up intuitive judgements, but this does not mean that we can 
neglect the psychology of intuitive judgement, since deliberate judgment easily can be led astray by 
plausible but false intuitions.171  
4.3.1. Explaining away Intuitive Judgement 
In order for the counterexamples which I described above to be evidence against Anti-
Intellectualism, it must not only be that we judge that they are possible cases in which there is a gap 
between ability and knowledge how; these judgements must stand up to closer philosophical 
scrutiny. In particular we should be cautious, because there are a number of related concepts which 
might be indicated in judgements about knowledge-how and ability. 
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4.3.2. Ability 
There are a number of related concepts which surround judgements of ability, which brings 
a great deal of expressive power to natural language, but also introduces the possibility of confusion. 
We say that someone can do something, that they could do it, that they can do it now, that they are 
able to do it, and that they have the ability to do it. Attempting to distinguish the jobs which these 
concepts do is a task beyond this section, but a couple of observations will suffice to show that 
intuitive judgement is easily confused.  
When we judge that someone cannot do something, there are two kinds of judgement 
which we might be making: that they lack the capabilities required, or that they lack the opportunity 
for the exercise of those capabilities.172 I cannot run a four-minute mile if I am not fit enough, but I 
also cannot run a  ten-minute mile if my legs are tied together (although I am fit enough to do so). 
Judgements about what people can do are even more complex: they can concern physical possibility 
(anyone young enough to train can run a four-minute mile), actual possibility (I can run a ten-minute 
mile right now with my shoes on, but not with them off) or opportunity (I can run home because I 
brought my running shoes in with me).  
In order for the counterexamples to hold up against the Praxist, the lack of ability cases must 
be ones in which the agents lose their ability, and the lack of know-how cases must be ones in which 
the agents possess an ability despite their lack of knowledge how. I will suggest that several of the 
cases do not achieve this result. 
The case of lack of opportunity cases should not trouble the Praxist. In this case I retain the 
ability, but am not able to exercise it because of the lack of opportunity, so the example does not 
address the Praxist’s claim, and cannot show that her account of knowledge how is false. It is 
entirely natural to say that I cannot make a Christmas pudding in the world without sugar since I do 
not have the opportunity to do so, but it would also be right to say that I have the ability to make a 
better Christmas pudding than my brother. 
We might also want to say that the cyclist losing her leg is a condition which interferes with 
her ability rather than removing it, since she could easily acquire a prosthesis which would allow her 
to exercise her ability.173 On this line of response, the leg is not a part of the ability, but rather an 
opportunity for its exercise. This response is a little trickier, and might require some revision to 
intuitive judgement, but there is certainly something intuitively plausible about it. Upon gaining the 
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prosthesis, the cyclist does not gain a new ability, but regains the opportunity to exercise the ability 
she had before her unfortunate accident.  
We can make similar moves in the cases of opportunity without know-how and lucky success 
to argue that these agents do not possess ability. In the cases of opportunity it is natural to say that 
the subject can do something which they do not know how to do, but this need not imply that they 
in fact have the relevant ability, since the judgement is set up as one about possible courses of 
action, not the agent’s capacity. In Hawley’s case of the lucky snow-swimmer our intuitive 
judgement is that Sally is able to swim out of the avalanche, but that she does not know how to, 
because she has never heard of making swimming movements to get out of an avalanche. She 
certainly could get out of the avalanche in the sense of having the physical capability – after all she 
did – but this does not show that she had the ability to do so, since her getting out is explained by 
the fluke of her hallucination, rather than her abilities.174 She did not have the ability to snow-swim, 
but she had all of the physical capacities required to do so, which the situation fortuitously caused 
her to exercise in the right way. 
4.3.3. Knowledge how  
We ought to also be careful in distinguishing types of knowledge how. Above I pointed out 
that there are several types of knowledge ascribed with the word how which are irrelevant to the 
issue at hand: knowing how I ought to do something, and knowing how something is done. If 
counterexamples involve these types of knowledge how then they do not present a problem for the 
Praxist, since she is not committed to an analysis of these types of knowledge.  
A good example to illustrate this point is Snowdon’s Susan example. Susan has learnt how to 
address the queen but be unable to do so due to her Royal nerves. Does she possess the practical 
kind of knowledge how? Perhaps not: we might think that we can better describe the case by saying 
‘she knows how one ought to address the queen, but cannot do it’ than by saying ‘she knows how 
she can address the queen, but cannot do it.’ If this description of the case holds up, then the 
counterexample breaks down, because the Anti-Intellectualist is not concerned with the non-
propositionality of this kind of knowledge how. 
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Perhaps we could also make a similar move in the cases of the unable teachers and say that 
they know how one does, or ought to do various things, but do not know how to engage in these 
activities themselves, a move suggested by both Stanley and Noë.175  
 Without supplementary arguments, intuitive judgements are at best weak evidence that a 
counterexample is genuine, which means that we ought to give hypothetical cases close 
consideration before accepting them. This raises the possibility that intuitively plausible cases will 
break down, as we have seen. I have illustrated two ways in which the Anti-Intellectualist can 
respond to the counterexamples presented above by distinguishing between different sense of ‘can’, 
and species of knowledge how. 
4.4. The Counterexample Fallacy 
Even if a counterexample succeeds, it is not the final word on an analysis. The important 
part of an analysis is not the exact terms in which it is expressed, but the insights which it 
encapsulates. It is always legitimate for a theorist to try to restate their theory in different terms to 
avoid the relevant counterexamples, or to claim that we ought to revise our judgement about the 
relevant cases. In short, it is fallacious to conclude from the existence of one counterexample to a 
theory that all versions of the theory are problematic.  
In a recent discussion of counterexamples to the conditional analysis of dispositions, 
Bonevac, Dever and Sosa make this point succinctly: 
“Counterexamples refute proposals, more or less one at a time […] while they can refute 
specific instances of a style of theory, counterexamples are not in themselves to the style as 
a whole. Instead they are tools for refinement, allowing a better choice of specific instances 
of that style to be endorsed.”176 
They call the fallacy of generalising from one counterexample to a specific analysis to the 
failure of a style of theory the Counterexample Fallacy. They concede that it is possible to refute a 
theory using counterexamples, but point out that in order to do so one must find a formula for 
generating counterexamples, which exploits the basic commitments of a style of theory. 
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To give an example of this fallacy, an epistemologist might conclude from Gettier’s 1963 
cases that the justified true belief (JTB) theory of knowledge is false. This would be much too quick, 
because Gettier’s examples are rather narrowly focused. The actual cases in Gettier’s paper are 
aimed against a JTB theory of knowledge which construes justification along Internalist lines,177 and 
has no auxiliary conditions. In response to these cases, a JTB theorist might add other conditions 
(such as no false lemmas), strengthen the justification condition or move to an externalist account of 
justification. What we need to convert Gettier’s cases into a problem for the JTB theory is not 
examples in which an agent has justified true belief but fails to possess knowledge, but a general 
recipe for coming up with such cases which picks up on essential features of the JTB analysis. Linda 
Zagzebski suggests that the key to constructing Gettier cases is the conjunction of an element truth-
undermining but justification-independent bad luck, with truth-restoring but justification-
independent good luck, which results in a subject fulfilling the conditions of the analysis, but only by 
luck.178 This recipe will apply to any JTB theory, since all members of this family or theories endorse 
the idea that there is some gap between justification and truth (otherwise it would be the JB 
theory). If this recipe holds good, and only then, can we say that the JTB theory is refuted by Gettier-
style examples.   
It is clear that all of the counterexamples which I address above are concerned with Praxism. 
All of the cases are constructed to show the gap between knowing how to φ and the ability to φ, and 
say nothing about the other abilities or capacities which an agent might have. To see how other Anti-
Intellectualist positions might avoid the counterexamples it will be useful to consider Ryle’s position. 
Ryle claims that knowing how to go something is the capacity to act intelligently within a certain 
range, which he cashes out in terms of the ability to apply criteria to performances (one’s own or 
others’). Adding conditions which interfere with performance or removing the opportunity to act 
oneself does not obviously remove the ability to apply criteria to performance, nor does it seem 
possible to construct an example in which someone luckily applies criteria to performance. The 
counterexamples simply miss what Ryle says about knowledge how.179 
A Praxist may also defend her position from these counterexamples by pointing out that the 
problems which they identify are really not problems with Praxism, but with the accounts of 
dispositions or abilities which Praxism appeals to. It is striking that the many of the counterexamples 
to Praxism have similar structures to well-established counterexamples to the conditional analysis of 
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dispositions. The cases of non-able knowers do look to be cases in which a disposition is masked by 
external conditions and the cases of lucky success look like cases of mimicking dispositions, so 
perhaps what we need is an account of abilities which can handle these problems. If a Praxist could 
provide an account of ability which deals with these problems, or argues that ability is a primitive 
term in her analysis then her account might be defensible against these cases.180 
4.4.1. Formulae for Counterexamples to Anti-Intellectualism 
Bengson and Moffett have tried to take the significance of the counterexample fallacy on 
board by proposing formulae for generating counterexamples to Anti-Intellectualism. They make 
two stabs at this, both of which fall short of showing Anti-Intellectualism to be false. The first 
contends that any account of knowledge how which does not include understanding is mistaken 
because it will allow cases of agents fulfilling the conditions of the analysis but failing to know how 
due to misunderstanding.181 The second diagnoses what they take to be a structural flaw in Anti-
Intellectualism.182 
4.4.2. Formula 1: Lack of Understanding 
Bengson and Moffett’s guiding thought in constructing their first formula is that knowledge 
how is exercised in intentional action, which requires understanding, meaning that 
misunderstanding undermines knowledge how. This suggests a formula for generating 
counterexamples to any analysis of knowledge-how: describe a case such that the agent fulfils all of 
the conditions of the analysis of knowledge how, introduce a misunderstanding which undermines 
their knowledge how, before introducing whatever conditions are needed so that the 
misunderstanding does not undermine the conditions of the analysis.183 They give an example of 
lucky success as an example. They describe a skater, Irina, who has a mistaken conception of how to 
do a move called the Salchow, but nonetheless is able to perform the Salchow reliably (thereby 
fulfilling the conditions of the target Praxist analysis), because her mistaken conception is brought 
into action by a neurological abnormality which means that she brings the Salchow off normally 
whenever she tries.184  
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Putting to one side concerns about the coherence of this case, the formula does not show 
that Anti-Intellectualism is false.185 As they admit, at best the formula shows that understanding 
must be present in or entailed by the final account. But they have no reason for supposing that an 
Anti-Intellectualist account of knowledge how might not entail understanding. Ryle certainly thinks 
there is a connection between knowing how and understanding, as he claims that “understanding is 
a part of knowing how.”186 Additionally, if there is as close a connection between intentional action 
and understanding as Bengson and Moffett think, then a Praxist could avoid the counterexamples 
easily by saying that knowing how to do something is the ability to engage in that activity 
intentionally.187 If they were to make this move, it would mean that cases along the lines of Irina’s 
could not be constructed because misunderstanding would be incompatible with the agent’s ability 
to act intentionally. To see this, it is worth considering that Irina’s case is basically similar to deviant 
causal chain counterexamples to the causal theory of action, which everyone agrees are not cases of 
intentional action.188 
4.4.3. Formula 2: A Structural Flaw 
 Bengson and Moffett’s second formula exploits the structure of the counterexamples 
sketched above to contend that Anti-Intellectualism has a structural flaw.189 They consider non-
necessity and non-sufficiency cases to the equation of knowledge how with ability, and argue that in 
order to respond to these counterexamples, the Anti-Intellectualist would need to both weaken 
their view and strengthen their view. The cases of unable knowers mean that less than ability is 
required for knowing how, whereas the cases of able non-knowers entail that more than ability is 
required. It seems impossible to both weaken and strengthen the ability condition in these ways, so 
they contend that there is no way for Anti-Intellectualism to deal with both styles of counterexample 
simultaneously.  
The problem with the tension argument construed as a problem for Anti-Intellectualism in 
general is that the ability-analysis which it targets means that it only causes problems for Praxism, 
rather than all versions of Anti-Intellectualism. If we think that knowledge how is a complex of 
dispositions rather than just a single ability it is possible to respond to both styles of 
counterexample.  Someone who knows how but cannot engage in the characteristic activity of that 
know-how will usually be able to engage in other relevant activities (teaching, instructing, 
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observing). Someone who can engage in the characteristic activity (by luck or whatever) but does 
not know how by contrast will typically not be able to engage in these other activities. Therefore, 
Ryleanism can respond to both the cases of unable knowers, and the cases of able non-knowers. 
4.5. Explaining the Views of the Folk 
Alongside the negative use of counterexamples, some have tried to use the above 
counterexamples as evidence for Intellectualism.190 The thought seems to be that since there are 
well-established folk judgements which show a gap between knowing how and ability, this is 
something which a theory of knowing how ought to be able to explain if it is to establish reflective 
equilibrium with the views of the folk. It would be fairly easy to explain this gap on typical 
Intellectualist views. If we think that knowing how to do something is knowing that such-and-such is 
a way of doing it, then we can explain why the unable knowers, know, and the able non-knowers do 
not. The agents in the first cases possess a piece of knowledge-that which those in the second lack; 
their abilities are irrelevant. 
The problem with the consideration of the gap between ability and knowledge how 
construed as an argument for Intellectualism is that all developed Anti-Intellectualist views also 
make a distinction between knowledge how and ability.191 The gap between ability and knowledge 
how might cause a problem for Praxism, but it is not a problem for all Anti-Intellectualist views.  
In fact, Ryle can offer a nice explanation of the problematic cases of interfering conditions, 
lucky success, and learning as you go along, which are the remaining cases which pose a gap 
between know-how and ability. 
Ryle claims that knowledge how to do something can be exercised in activities other than 
the doing of the activity narrowly construed, because he sees the characteristic exercise of 
knowledge how as the application of criteria to action. He claims that: 
“You exercise your knowledge of how to tie a clove-hitch not only in acts of tying clove-
hitches and in correcting your mistakes, but also in imagining tying them correctly, in 
instructing pupils, in criticising the incorrect or clumsy movements and applauding the 
correct movements that they make, in inferring from a faulty result to the error which 
produced it, in predicting the outcomes of observed lapses, and so on indefinitely.”192 
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This offers a nice explanation of why agents who are prevented from doing what they know 
how to do, still possess knowledge how. Although one way to apply criteria to action is to apply 
them to one’s own, another is to apply them to others, either in instruction or in skilled observation. 
This means Ryle can explain why unable agents and teachers possess knowledge how. In both cases, 
the agents can apply their knowledge in instruction and criticism, despite the fact that they cannot 
perform the activity narrowly construed.  
Ryle can also explain why the cases of lucky success do not count as knowledge how. 
Consider his comment on flukes: 
“To decide whether his [the marksman’s] bull’s eye was a fluke or a good shot, we need and 
he himself might need to take into account more than this one success. Namely, we should 
take into account his subsequent shots, his past record, his explanations or excuses, the 
advice he gave to his neighbour and a host of other clues of various sorts” 193 
The thought here seems to be that the fact that someone succeeds at doing something is 
insufficient to demonstrate their knowing how because success does not guarantee their having the 
right kind of intelligent capacity. An intelligent success needs to be explained by ability, rather than 
fluke, and one way of checking this is to check other situations in which the agent might exercise her 
knowledge.194 It seems to be pretty plausible that all of the cases of lucky success are ‘flukes’ in 
Ryle’s sense. 
The case of doing something while learning, and impossible activities require us to go a little 
beyond Ryle’s discussion, although in a Rylean spirit. It is a neglected point that Ryle’s discussion 
concerns examples of general knowledge-how which relates agents to practices, such as fishing, 
cooking, chess-playing and reasoning, rather than examples of knowledge how tied to particular 
tasks.195 We might say that he is interested in general know-how. Examples of this general know-
how can be found in the cases of learning while doing: if I am following an Ikea plan to build a 
wardrobe, then I certainly have the knowledge how required to follow plans. It is this general 
knowledge-how which gives me the ability to make wardrobes. This does not entail my knowing how 
to make this particular wardrobe, in fact more likely than not I do not possess this knowledge. 
Similarly, in Bengson and Moffett’s π example, for Ryle the agent concerned possesses general 
mathematical know-how plus the algorithm for finding digits in the decimal expansion of π. For Ryle, 
this knowledge does not entail knowing how to find the 1046 digit, which is a distinct piece of 
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knowledge-how (which presumably requires knowing how to use computer algorithms, and so on). 
The combination of ability with lack of know-how which these cases are designed to show breaks 
down when we introduce a notion of general know-how.  
4.6. Conclusion 
In this section, I have considered the use of counter-examples against Anti-Intellectualism, 
and found it lacking on a number of counts. Although we do make intuitive judgements to the effect 
that there is a gap between knowledge how and ability, we should be cautious before taking these 
judgements to refute Anti-Intellectualism, or offer evidence for Intellectualism. A first point is that 
the examples target Praxism, meaning that other Anti-Intellectualist views are not obviously 
affected. Furthermore, intuitive judgements are at best a blunt tool, and can often be explained 
away, as we have seen. Even if some examples go through, Anti-Intellectualism might develop its 
position to include more sophisticated accounts of ability or move to claiming that knowledge how is 
a kind of capacity distinct from mere ability. The intuitive gap between judgements of know-how 
and ability does require explanation, but I have argued that Ryle offers a model for explaining the 
cases of unable knowers, lucky success, learning and impossible activities. 
That there are many problems with the use of counterexamples does not mean that they are 
irrelevant: they push the Anti-Intellectualist to make important clarifications to her view, and 
provide her with examples of knowledge how upon which to hone her view. They may also show 
that some analyses are false: perhaps supporters of Praxism will be convinced by the 
counterexamples of unable knowers, or able non-knowers, and give up the view. My point is that the 
Anti-Intellectualist is not compelled to give up her position in response to these examples, as she has 
a range of dialectical tools to respond to them. 
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5. Putting Knowledge-How into Action 
There has been a great deal of attention paid to the structure of the sentences which are 
used to ascribe knowledge how, and the combinations of know-how and ability in various 
hypothetical cases, but almost none paid to the role that knowledge how plays in the life of a 
minded creature.196 However, as we have seen, issues in the philosophy of mind remain in the 
background in discussions of know-how ascriptions and counterexamples to Praxism. To readdress 
this imbalance, I will sketch a number of conditions about the role of know-how in the life of a 
minded creature which can then serve as a basis for assessing different accounts of knowledge how. 
I hope to make a plausible case for three conditions: that knowledge how is a state which is 
characteristically exercised in successful intentional action, that acting intentionally is associated 
with knowledge how under some description, and that knowledge how grounds reliable action. 
These conditions are not, I hope partisan, but are rather necessary conditions on knowing how 
which both Intellectualists and Anti-Intellectualists can agree on. To show how these conditions 
might lead inquiry into the nature of knowledge how, I will show that they cause problems for 
Stanley and Williamson’s account, and sketch a Rylean account which is better able to deal with 
them. 
In the first section, I will set out three conditions which I take to encapsulate the connection 
of knowledge how to intentional action, and offer some evidence that these conditions are widely 
accepted. In the second section, I will return to Stanley and Williamson’s Intellectualism, to consider 
how they might account for these conditions. I will argue that their appeal to deferred ostension is 
not satisfactory in arguing for the general presence of knowledge how, because of the indefiniteness 
of demonstrative reference. Furthermore, they have difficulty accounting for the fact that 
knowledge how grounds reliable action, since on their account ways of acting with specific 
situations, whereas knowledge how needs to be general to ground reliability. In the third section, I 
will turn to the role which knowledge of procedures plays in intentional action, and set out a picture 
of the interaction of propositional and non-propositional knowledge in intentional action. 
5.1.  Knowing How and Intentional Action  
The connection between knowledge how and intentional action seems to be a background 
assumption in recent literature on knowledge how, perhaps motivated by the thought that someone 
who knows how to engage in some activity can – in the normal case at least – engage in that activity. 
As we have seen in the previous section, there is a great deal of controversy about whether knowing 
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how is ability-entailing, so we cannot just appeal to ability to explain this connection. As an 
alternative, I suggest that there are three conditions which connect knowledge-how to intentional 
action: 
i. Knowledge how is a mental state such that its characteristic exercise is successful intentional 
action. 
ii. Knowledge how plays a general role in agency, in that acting intentionally always requires 
some knowledge how.  
iii. Knowledge how is a state which secures reliable action in a range of circumstances.197 
5.1.1 The Exercise of Knowledge How 
The first condition is eloquently expressed by Anscombe: 
“When we ordinarily speak of practical knowledge we have in mind a certain sort of general 
capacity in a particular field, but if we hear of a capacity it is reasonable to ask what 
constitutes an exercise of it. […] in the case of practical knowledge the exercise of the 
capacity is nothing but the doing or supervising of the operations of which a man has 
practical knowledge.”198 
Anscombe’s thought seems to be that the intuitive concept of knowledge how or practical 
knowledge is that of a general capacity and that the exercise of this capacity is a range of intentional 
actions.  
There are two important clarifications to make here. To say that knowledge how is a 
capacity to engage in intentional action is not to say that this capacity is not grounded in 
propositional knowledge. My capacity to open the safe in Paul Snowdon’s office is grounded in my 
knowing that the combination to the lock is such-and-such a sequence.199 Hence, this condition is 
compatible with Intellectualism. In fact, Bengson and Moffett make the claim that knowledge how is 
apt to guide intentional action a central part of their Intellectualist account of knowledge how.200  
The second important clarification is that saying that the characteristic exercise of 
knowledge is successful intentional actions is not to say that knowledge how is only exercised in 
successful action. We need space to say that we exercise knowledge how when we mess up doing 
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something or are stopped before we complete a whole act.201 It is in the doing of intentional actions 
which we exercise our knowledge how, which means that we begin exercising this knowledge when 
we start acting. 
5.1.2. Intentional Action and Know-How 
The second condition takes the idea of knowledge how as a capacity to engage in intentional 
action, and generalises it to all intentional action. Anscombe again: 
“‘Intentional action’ always presupposes what might be called ‘knowing one’s way about’ 
the matters described in the description under which an action can be called intentional, 
and this knowledge is exercised in the action and is practical knowledge.”202 
It is tempting to read this condition as saying that if an agent is acting intentionally she 
knows how to do what she is doing intentionally. This claim is too strong, because there are a 
number of situations in which it is possible to intentionally engage in some activity without knowing 
how to engage in it. For example, we sometimes learn how to do things by doing them,203 and we 
follow plans to build things without knowing all of the steps ahead of time.204 Perhaps it is even 
possible to bring something off intentionally but luckily without knowing how to do it.205  
We can deal with these cases by introducing a level of sophistication into our discussion. 
That which we do intentionally has a number of different descriptions, some of which are 
intentional, others of which are not. For example, the pumper’s pumping of the water is intentional; 
his casting a shadow on the rocks is not.206 The descriptions under which action is intentional are 
hierarchically ordered by a by-chain of rationalisation which expresses the structure of the agent’s 
practical reasoning. The pumper is moving his arm in order to pump water, in order to replenish the 
water-supply and so on. The claim about the general presence of knowledge how does not need to 
extend to all of the intentional descriptions, but only to descriptions which are lower in the chain of 
rationalisation.207  
Consider my activity as I build a house: I might be doing all kinds of things intentionally 
(brick-laying, cement mixing, plastering) in order to build the house, but without knowing how to 
build a house. Perhaps I am simply following a very detailed set of instructions which I retrieved 
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from the internet.208 My lack of high-level knowledge how does not mean that I not building a house 
intentionally, since I have knowledge how relating to more teleologically basic descriptions of my 
action.209 
There is nothing here to trouble the Intellectualist; in fact Stanley and Williamson endorse 
the strong, unmodified version of this thesis: 
“We do find it very plausible that intentional actions are employments of knowledge-how. 
Indeed […], the thesis that intentional actions are employments of knowledge-how is 
precisely what accounts for the initial plausibility of Ryle's original argument against the 
claim that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that.”210  
5.1.3. Know-How and Reliability 
The third condition expresses a demand for reliability from agents who possess knowledge 
how. Although it is a serious question how to formulate this demand, I think that it is extremely 
plausible.211 Firstly, knowledge is a concept which has clear conceptual links to reliability, so we 
ought to expect reliability from knowledge how, which is after all a species of knowledge.212 
Secondly, there is a strong intuition that someone who pulls something off but could not do so in 
slightly different circumstances does not know how to engage in that activity.213 If I intend to 
perform a somersault on a trampoline and do so successfully, but could not do so in a relevantly 
similar situation, then I do not know how to perform a somersault. 
We can express this condition by saying that knowledge how is a relation to something 
which is generic which can be exercised in an open-ended range of situations.214 Something like this 
condition is formulated by Katherine Hawley in her discussion of the counterfactual success 
condition on knowledge-how.215   
                                                          
208
 (Bengson and Moffett 2011b) 
209
 On teleological basicness, see (Hornsby 1980) 
210
 (Stanley and Williamson 2001, pp.442-3) see also (Stanley 2011b, pp.185-90). Bengson and Moffett claim to 
reject this condition in their 2009, but then exploit a connection between intentional action and understanding 
in their 2011b to argue that knowledge how is understanding, which suggests that they do accept some 
version of this thesis 
211
 One suggestion is that this reliability condition should be expressed as a safety condition, along the 
following lines: if S tries to φ, then she will not easily fail at φ-ing, and will usually bring her φ-ing off 
successfully. See (Brogaard 2011, p.147) for discussion of knowledge how and safety.  
212
 (Moore 1997, pp.173-81) 
213
 (Carr 1981 p.53) 
214
 (Hornsby 2011) 
215
 This might depend on how we flesh out the contextual elements of her discussion (Hawley 2003) 
71 
 
As with the other conditions, this claim compatible with an Intellectualist position: it is a 
necessary condition on knowing how, and not a sufficient condition.216 In fact, Stanley endorses 
Hawley’s modal success condition as expressing the modal force of know-how ascriptions.217 
5.2. Stanley and Williamson on Knowledge How and Action 
To see how these conditions can be a useful way of assessing accounts of knowledge how, I 
will consider how Stanley and Williamson’s account might deal with them.  
To recap, they claim that the nature of the relevant kind of knowledge how is captured by 
the following claim: 
(S&W2): S knows how to φ if and only if for some contextually relevant way, w, which is a 
way for her to φ, there is a practical mode of presentation, m, such that she knows under m 
that w is a way for her to φ. 
Although they do not explicitly discuss how their account is to explain these conditions, it 
seems clear that they do have resources within their account which are geared towards explaining 
them.  
To explain the fact that knowledge how is characteristically exercised in successful 
intentional action, they will presumably appeal to the idea that knowledge-how is knowledge of 
propositions considered under a practical mode of presentation, which disposes agents to act in 
certain complex ways (see §2.4.3.). And to explain why the characteristic exercise of this knowledge 
is successful action, they presumably have to give a picture of ways of acting in which they are finely-
grained and detailed representations of successful action, indexed to the particular situation. If they 
do not make this move, a ‘way’ will look more like a loose set of instructions, then it will require an 
intelligent operation to enact it, meaning that Ryle’s regress can start off. 218 
To explain the general presence of knowledge how in intentional action, they will appeal to 
deferred ostension, as this is their favoured tool for responding to examples in which it is in question 
whether someone possesses the relevant propositional knowledge. 219 Their appeal goes something 
like this: everyone who acts intentionally possesses the propositional knowledge with which they are 
concerned, because anyone who is acting intentionally can point to their activity, and say “this is 
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how I can do it,” and in so doing express their knowledge of the way of doing what they know how 
to do.  
The third property of knowledge how is a little more tricky to explain on (S&W2), since ways 
of acting need to be indexed to particular successful actions in order to explain success, whereas 
knowledge how is generic, securing reliable action in a range of situations.220 In discussing Stanley 
and Williamson’s appeal to Ginet’s door-opening example, Hornsby points out that: 
“Rather than enabling your participation simply in the event of your turning the knob that 
actually there was, your knowledge how to turn a door knob ensures that you would turn 
the knob in an appropriate way in a range of circumstances.”221 
One option to get in the required reliability is to say that knowing how to do something is 
not just the knowledge of one way, but of a set of ways of acting which are appropriate for a range 
of situations. Stanley seems to endorse this picture of knowledge how when he claims that: 
“When we say that a skilled outfielder knows how to field a fly ball, we do not mean that he 
knows, of at least one way to field a fly ball that it gives him counterfactual success in 
fielding fly balls. […] Rather, in such a case, we mean the mention-all reading of the 
embedded question. What we assert when we assert of a skilled outfielder that he knows 
how to field fly balls is that he knows all of a set of relevant ways that give him success in 
fielding fly balls.”222  
Stanley makes this claim as a way of showing that his account is able to explain the nature of 
expertise, but I think that it is legitimate to construe this as a general move to deal with the problem 
of securing reliability. 
If we introduce the mention-all reading of the embedded question in knowledge how 
ascriptions, then we should change the analysis to: 
(S&W3): S knows how to φ if and only if for each of a contextually relevant set of ways, w1, 
w2, … wn, which are all ways for her to φ, there is a practical mode of presentation m such 
that S knows under m that that way is a way for her to φ. 
                                                          
220
 (Hornsby 2011, p.92) 
221
 (Hornsby 2011 pp.94-5)  
222
 (Stanley 2011b, p.183)  
73 
 
5.3. Ways of Acting 
Many philosophers have argued that the idea of the practical mode of presentation is the 
suspicious notion in Stanley and Williamson’s analysis. I think that it is in fact the notion of a way of 
acting which is suspicious. We ought to be sceptical both of Stanley and Williamson’s sketchiness in 
discussing ways of acting, and of the appeal to deferred ostension as a way of securing the general 
presence of knowledge of ways.   
Above, in §2.4.2, we saw that Stanley and Williamson claim that ways are properties of 
token events. They do not intend to pick out a manner of acting, but something more like the 
method according to which agents act. We have also seen above that these methods need to be 
indexed to particular situations in order that they are suitable to guide agents to success in action, 
and that they also need to be known by anyone who acts intentionally to explain the general 
presence of knowledge-how. 
Certainly sometimes we do know a ways to do thing, which guides us to success; the 
question is whether we should think that whenever we act intentionally we know such a way, under 
a practical mode of presentation. The only reason which Stanley and Williamson give us for thinking 
that we do is that we are able to use deferred ostension to pick out our method for doing whatever 
we are doing intentionally. But by itself, the appeal to the possibility of deferred ostension is not 
sufficient to show this because deferred reference does not always succeed in picking out a method. 
Any action is an instantiation of a huge number of different properties, and simply pointing to it will 
not pick out any one without further context.223 For example, if while cycling I say to someone “this 
is a way in which I can cycle,” the right response would not be “Ah, you are cycling like that; now I 
know how you cycle,” but “yes, I can see that you are cycling, but how are you cycling?” 224  Activity 
typically instantiates too many ways for it to be possible to simply pick them out like we do the 
colour of an object. In the examples which Stanley and Williamson discuss (the cyclist who cycles in a 
funny manner, the punch-drunk boxer) further context is supplied by the situation, which locates a 
particular way of acting, but these are rather unusual cases, which do not demonstrate that 
intentional action is always associated with this kind of knowledge. 
The reason why the appeal to deferred ostension might seem plausible to Stanley and 
Williamson is that they take actions to be particulars – token events – meaning that it should be easy 
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to pick out their properties. However, the realm of human agency is not confined to the causation of 
token events: sometimes we are in the course of doing things without having got to the end, and 
sometimes we are stopped in the course of acting. In both cases we will have been acting 
intentionally, but not performed any token event intentionally. In order to account for this fact, we 
shall need to realise that the right ontology for action is one of process not of events.225 Actions 
unfold, rather than coming in event-sized pieces, and intelligence is exercised through acting.226  
Paying due attention to the on-going character of action makes it seem even less plausible 
that a demonstrative can pick out my way of acting. If I am cycling from Russell Square to 
Hampstead, then there is no token event of riding to Hampstead to refer to because I have simply 
not got there yet. I cannot use a demonstrative to refer to the method which is a property of my on-
going performance, because it is not settled how I will get to Hampstead. I might need to take a 
detour; I might get stopped at the traffic lights. This point then generalises to explain why deferred 
ostension fails in many cases. 
The point about the unfolding of action also has implications for what it takes to secure 
reliability in propositional terms. Since I might engage in a number of different ways of getting to my 
goal, in order that any of these possible courses of action be guided solely by propositional 
knowledge, I must know all a whole range of conditional propositions, which represent ways of 
responding to the situation as it unfolds.227 
5.4. Assessment 
We have seen that if Stanley and Williamson’s seek to explain the above features of 
knowledge how, they are committed to saying that an agent who knows how to do something must 
know a whole range of finely-grained ways of acting, which can guide them to success in a suitable 
set of situations, alongside a number of conditional propositions which allow them to adjust to 
various eventualities which might arise in the course of their activity. There are a number of 
problems with this account.  
i) Firstly, it requires a huge number of pieces of knowledge to explain intentional action. 
The account looks less like a philosophical reading of the linguistics literature, and more 
like a substantive and controversial epistemological claim about what we know when we 
know how to do something. 
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ii) Secondly, it requires an account of what the range of situations in which an agent will 
exercise her knowledge how are. Without this, the need for reliability commits (S&W3) 
to ascribing agents an indefinite amount of propositional knowledge. If we think that 
knowledge how prepares us for an open-ended set of different situations, then there is 
simply no way of specifying this knowledge in propositional terms.228  
 
iii) Thirdly, once the agent has a range of knowledge in play which she exercises in order to 
engage in some activity, it becomes increasingly important that they are guided by the 
appropriate proposition. It is little help to me that I know many ways of catching fly--balls 
if I cannot be guided by the right one at the right time.229 Stanley needs an account of the 
selection of the appropriate method, which does not need to appeal to an intelligent 
mechanism for selecting methods.  
 
iv) Fourthly, the heavy epistemic commitments of their account of knowledge how 
ascriptions makes it much less plausible that we do in fact know the propositions which 
(S&W3) commits us to knowing in the problem cases posed to Stanley and Williamson’s 
analysis. Consider how Stanley and Williamson could possibly go about convincing 
Schiffer that the 8 year old Mozart knows a whole host of propositions concerning 
various methods for writing symphonies.230 
The underlying problem seems to be that Stanley and Williamson want to specify the 
content of knowledge how in a way that its manifestation fully explains successful intentional action, 
but they also need to be able to explain the fact that knowledge how disposes us to act reliably, 
which commits them to saying that someone who knows how possesses an enormous, potentially 
indefinite amount of knowledge.  
5.5. Knowledge of Procedure and Non-Propositional Know-How 
The failure of Stanley and Williamson’s position to account for the role of knowledge how in 
action will be grist to the mill of the Praxist. However, we might worry that the Praxist position falls 
in to the same error of the standard reading of Ryle: assuming that because knowledge of 
propositions does not exhaust knowledge-how, it has no role to play in it.231 Jennifer Hornsby has 
recently offered a compromise position, by arguing that if we want an account of the knowledge 
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which we exercise in action, we shall need to pay due attention to the role of both propositional and 
non-propositional knowledge.232  
 I know how to make tea, and I do so often. When I do so, I generally follow a set of steps: i) 
boil the kettle, ii) get out the mug, teabag and milk, iii) put the boiled water on the tea bag, and add 
milk, iv) take out the teabag when it is brewed. I could not make tea without knowing that these 
steps are a way of doing so. However, knowing a method does not exhaust the knowledge which I 
exercise in tea-making. I must have all kinds of propositional knowledge about the situation (where 
the teabags are what they look like, whether the milk is off), and various pieces of standing 
knowledge (what tea and milk are).  
I must also know how to engage in the various steps if I am to follow the method 
successfully. I need to know how to boil a kettle, get out the mugs and so on. This knowledge 
parallels the by-relations between descriptions of intentional action we saw above: I know that I can 
boil the water by turning on the kettle, which I can do by flicking the switch and so on. To save from 
attributing me an indefinite number of pieces of knowledge, my knowledge of means must bottom 
out somewhere, with some activities which I can ‘simply do’  without the need to exercise 
knowledge of methods. 233  For example, I presumably have the knowledge how which equips me to 
simply reach out and flick the kettle on.  
We might call knowledge of step-wise methods, and of the means to take to engage in the 
various steps, Instrumental knowledge how, and call knowledge which lies at the bottom of the by-
chains, Basic knowledge how.234 Although instrumental know-how is clearly propositional, it is 
difficult to see how basic know-how could be. I simply engage in those activities which are basic for 
me, so there is no way in which I engage in them. The question ‘how?’ has application (in 
Anscombe’s special sense) to both basic and non-basic action, but whereas in the case of non-basic 
action, the agent has an answer of the form “I can φ by ψ-ing,” in the case of basic action, her best 
answer is something along the lines of “I can just do it.”235  
 As well as Instrumental and Basic knowledge how, we must have a variety of other 
capacities to secure successful action. When I am acting out my knowledge of a procedure, I need to 
know when to move from one step to another, and how to do so. I must also be alive to the progress 
which I am making in following this plan, adjusting to contingencies and errors in performance. If I 
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absent-mindedly put coffee into the mug instead of tea, I need to pick up on this, and take 
appropriate action to get my tea-making back on course.236 I also need the capacity to pick up 
relevant knowledge along the way, organising my attention to the features of my situation which are 
relevant to the task at hand.237 For example, I need the capacity to find the tea amongst all of the 
other things in the cupboard, and to keep track of the position of the mug through the tea-making. 
In other words, there is a receptive dimension of intentional activity which is crucial to success in 
action. 
In cases in which we are acting without having a plan in mind, this receptive dimension of 
intentional action becomes crucial. If I set out to walk to Hampstead Heath without knowing the 
way, it will be very important to me that I have the requisite capacities to work out when I am on the 
right track and when I am not, and that I can pick up relevant information along the way. In such 
cases my activity is intelligent insofar as I know how to find my way, and not insofar as I know the 
way. There is an element of improvisation and spontaneity to acting without a plan which would be 
hugely difficult to adequately model on an Intellectualist account.238 
When we act, we act for reasons, so it should not be surprising that we exercise knowledge 
of means and methods for achieving our goals. However, we must also take basic means, and adjust 
along the way, so we need to know our way about, to borrow Anscombe’s phrase. I hope to have 
sketched a reasonably plausible picture of how this knowledge is exercised, although there are many 
loose ends, which I do not have space to address here. 
5.6. Conclusion 
In this section I have set out several connections between knowledge how and intentional 
action, shown how they cause problems for Stanley and Williamson’s Intellectualism, and sketched a 
compromise position between Praxism and Intellectualism, according to which both propositional 
and non-propositional knowledge is exercised in intelligent action. This position deserves to be 
called Rylean, since it pays attention to the importance of non-propositional knowledge in action, 
but it equally respects the importance of propositional knowledge in intentional action. Although my 
discussion has been brief, I hope to have shown that further consideration of the role which 
knowledge how plays in the life of a minded creature might be extremely fruitful. 
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6. Conclusion 
I have principally been concerned with methodological issues in this essay, so in summing up 
I will briefly summarise my methodological conclusions, and take stock of where they leave the 
debate about the nature of knowledge how. 
 I have looked at two main sources of evidence for Intellectualism: linguistics, and 
counterexamples to Praxism. I have argued that although the evidence from linguistics suggests a 
form which a plausible Intellectualist account might take, neither the compositional semantics of 
knowledge how ascriptions, nor the linguistic uniformity of knowledge-how with knowledge-wh 
offers decisive evidence for Intellectualism. Stanley and Williamson rely on several Intellectualist 
assumptions in setting up their analysis from the semantics, and their appeal to the linguistic 
uniformity of knowledge-how with knowledge-wh occludes some important dissimilarities between 
these kinds of knowledge. This is not to say that linguistics is irrelevant, but that it ought to be 
considered alongside other sources of evidence. Similarly, the counterexamples which are extant in 
the literature are not decisive evidence against Anti-Intellectualism. All of the examples target 
Praxism, which is only one of a number of possible Anti-Intellectualist positions. Even if the examples 
do target all Anti-Intellectualist positions, the Anti-Intellectualist has a number of moves available to 
her in responding to the counterexamples. She might, for example, adjust the terms of her account, 
or argue for a revision in intuitive judgement. 
My principal methodological conclusion is that the use of linguistic evidence and 
counterexamples are not self-standing sources of evidence, but require sophisticated understanding 
of other issues, and ought to be used alongside other sources of philosophical evidence. I have tried 
to demonstrate how other kinds of evidence can be fruitful in the final section by considering the 
connection between knowledge how and intentional action. 
My positive contribution to the debate about the nature of knowledge how is two-fold. I 
have undermined the two main arguments for Intellectualism, and have tried to carve out the logical 
space for a Rylean version of Anti-Intellectualism. The neglect of Rylean positions about the nature 
of knowledge how is striking, since Ryleanism can seemingly account for all of the relevant data. It is 
able to explain the linguistic data about knowledge how (§3.4 and §3.5), can explain our judgements 
about the gap between know-how and ability (§4.5), and can explain the connection between know-
how and Intentional action (§5.5). I suspect that Anti-Intellectualist will have their best case in 
developing the conceptual resources of Ryleanism, rather than in defending Praxism. 
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